Emirates B773 at Dubai on Dec 20th 2021, overran runway on departure

Last Update: January 19, 2025 / 11:05:34 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Emirates Airlines A6-EQI, Boeing 777-300 — Emirates Airlines A6-EQI, Boeing 777-300 (Photo credit: Ronnie Macdonald / Flickr / License: CC by)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Dec 20, 2021

Classification
Incident

Airline
Emirates Airlines

Flight number
EK-231

Departure
Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Destination
Washington Dulles, United States

Aircraft Registration
A6-EQI

Aircraft Type
Boeing 777-300

ICAO Type Designator
B773

Airport
Dubai International Airport, Dubai

Airport ICAO Code
OMDB

An Emirates Boeing 777-300, registration A6-EQI performing flight EK-231 from Dubai (United Arab Emirates) to Washington Dulles,DC (USA) with 354 passengers and 18 crew, was accelerating for takeoff from Dubai's runway 30R when the aircraft rotated for takeoff past the end of the runway and became airborne just at the end of the runway end safety area. The aircraft continued to Washington for a landing without further incident.

The aircraft performed the return flight EK-232 on schedule, then was grounded in Dubai and remained on the ground in Dubai for 4 days.

According to Mode-S data transmitted by the aircraft's transponder the aircraft remained on the ground until accelerating through at least 216 knots over ground about 4400 meters/14400 feet past the runway threshold at 23:10:48Z and about 90 meters short of the localizer antennas, was airborne at 75 feet AGL at 234 knots over ground already over the first residential houses past the runway (5640 meters/18500 feet past the runway threshold) at 23:10:58z, then climbed out to safety.

According to information The Aviation Herald received, the aircraft sustained some damage in the departure. There is also information, that a total of 4 crew members may have been dismissed as result of the occurrence.

On Dec 27th 2021 Emirates Airlines released a crew alert to their pilots following the occurrence suggesting the crew had not picked up the previous flight crew had left the altitude setting at the Master Control Panel at airport elevation/00000 feet causing the flight director to not indicate takeoff rotation and climb out but instead indicate to maintain that altitude (ALT mode). The airline wrote:

Crew Alert
**********

CO1408/21 COMPANY NOTAM - B777 MCP POWER UP DEFAULTS AND AFTER

LANDING/ SHUT DOWN MCP CHANGES

CREWS ARE REMINDED THAT THERE ARE NO FCOM NORMAL PROCEDURE (NP) REQUIREMENTS TO CHANGE THE MCP AFTER LANDING OR SHUTDOWN.

THERE HAVE BEEN TIMES WHEN THE MCP "ALTITUDE WINDOW" HAS BEEN SET TO THE AIRPORT ELEVATION WHICH MAY CAUSE ISSUES ON THE SUBSEQUENT DEPARTURE. THE FCOM 4.10.2 STATES THAT THE AFDS WILL ENGAGE IN "ALT" WHEN THE FIRST FLIGHT DIRECTOR SWITCH IS TURNED ON, IF THE MCP SELECTED ALTITUDE IS WITHIN 20 FEET OF THE DISPLAYED BARO ALTITUDE. CREWS SHALL NOT SET AIRPORT ELEVATION ON THE MCP AFTER LANDING OR SHUT DOWN.

- FTPB 27DEC21

On Feb 17th 2022 the United Arab Emirates GCAA released their preliminary report summarizing the sequence of events:

On 19 December 2021, an Emirates Boeing 777-300ER (Extended Range) Aircraft, registration A6-EQI, operating a scheduled passenger flight number EK231, departed from Dubai International Airport (OMDB), the United Arab Emirates, for Washington Dulles International Airport (KIAD), the United States.

The flight crew composed of four members divided into two sets A and B. Each set was comprised of one commander and one copilot. The Commander of set A operated as the pilot flying (PF) and the Copilot operated as the pilot monitoring (PM) for the flight.

The Commander stated that during cockpit preparation, she noticed that the altitude selector was set to 0000 feet and she selected it to 4,000 feet, which was also verified by the flight data recorder. The selection of 4,000 feet on the altitude selector was in accordance with the planned standard instrument departure (SID) of SENPA 2F1.

At 23:10:29 UTC, the Aircraft lifted off, and at 23:10:40 the landing gears were selected to ‘up’ position (retracted).

The Commander stated that after lift-off, and during climb, she followed the flight director command. However, the Aircraft rate of climb reached to a maximum of approximately 800 feet per minute. The flight crew were not able to adhere to published climb gradient of the SID due to the shallow climb.

At 23:11:01, the takeoff/go-around (TOGA) switch was selected and the flight mode annunciations (FMA) were changed to TOGA/TOGA. The flight directors indicated climb attitude on the Commander’s primary flight display (PFD). A flap 15 over-speed occurred as the airspeed increased towards 250 knots. The flight crew continued to their destination and landed uneventfully.

No damage was found to the aircraft at destination. The commander (42, ATPL, 10,849 hours total, 6,567 hours on type) was assisted by a first officer (26, ATPL, 4,644 hours total, 3,426 hours on type).

The GCAA released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:

The Air Accident Investigation Sector of the United Arab Emirates (AAIS) determines that the cause of the shallow climb Incident was the pitch down below the required pitch attitude required for achieving a positive and safe rate of climb. The Commander followed flight director commands reflected in the flight mode annunciator (FMA) that were not appropriate for the takeoff flight phase. The inappropriate pitch flight director commands were a result of incorrect AFDS pitch mode setting in the flight director that went unnoticed by the flight crew.

The contributing factors to the Incident are:

(a) As designed, the AFDS did not include any provisions to prevent a takeoff with incorrect AFDS pitch mode. The ALT pitch mode activates on the ground once either side flight directors is switched ‘on’ and the selected altitude is within 20 feet of the displayed barometric altitude.

(b) The Commander did not identify the incorrect AFDS pitch mode and inappropriate altitude entry that could have been caused by the pressure to achieve on-time performance and distractions during preflight phase.

(c) The Copilot, as the pilot monitoring, was aware of the incorrect AFDS pitch mode activation, however, he could not rectify it and did not bring it to the Commander’s attention.

(d) The FCOM did not contain explicit instructions on how to reset the flight directors in order to enable the crew to select the correct pitch mode. The FCOM only mentioned selecting an MCP altitude more than 20 feet from the displayed baro altitude and recycling the flight director switches in the Controls and Indicators description (Volume 2 − Systems Information), not the procedures (Volume 1 − Operational Limitations, Normal and Supplementary Procedures, and Dispatch Performance Data).

Metars:
OMDB 200200Z VRB02KT CAVOK 19/15 Q1019 NOSIG=
OMDB 200100Z 18003KT CAVOK 20/15 Q1018 NOSIG=
OMDB 200000Z 18003KT CAVOK 20/15 Q1018 NOSIG=
OMDB 192300Z 18002KT CAVOK 21/15 Q1019 NOSIG=
OMDB 192200Z 18002KT CAVOK 21/14 Q1019 NOSIG=
OMDB 192100Z 12003KT 060V220 CAVOK 22/15 Q1019 NOSIG=
OMDB 192000Z VRB02KT CAVOK 23/14 Q1019 NOSIG=
OMDB 191800Z 36004KT 330V080 CAVOK 25/14 Q1019 NOSIG=