Aliansa DC3 at Villavicencio on Jul 8th 2021, contact lost, missing aircraft collided with terrain

Last Update: November 27, 2023 / 17:55:02 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jul 8, 2021

Classification
Crash

Airline
Aliansa

Departure
Villavicencio, Colombia

Destination
Villavicencio, Colombia

Aircraft Registration
HK-2820

Aircraft Type
DOUGLAS DC-3

ICAO Type Designator
DC3

An Aliansa Douglas DC-3, registration HK-2820 performing a test flight from Villavicencio to Villavicencio (Colombia) with 3 crew, was climbing out of Villavicencio about 5 minutes after the departure when radar and radio contact was lost. The aircraft has not landed at any airport. A search for the missing aircraft was underway, the aircraft was found destroyed. All three crew had perished.

Colombia's Aerocivil reported the DC-3 HK-2820 is missing since 07:05L (12:05Z), when radar and radio contact was lost, after departure from Villavicencio at 07:00L (12:00Z).

Local media report the crew declared emergency shortly after departure, the search is currently focussing on the Guatiquia river canyon east of the aerodrome.

Colombia's Civil Defense reported the aircraft was on a training mission, it has not yet been found.

Colombian Authorities reported the aircraft had been repaired and performed a test flight. The aircraft is suspected in the Guatiquia river canyon northwest of the aerodrome between the villages of Restrepo and El Calvario at an altitude of about 1600-1700 meters.

In the evening of Jul 8th 2021 (local time) Aerocivil stated, that the search and rescue operations trying to locate the aircraft west of Restrepo are going to continue when sufficient daylight is available again.

Late Jul 9th 2021 the wreckage was located in dense undergrowth surrounded by trees, the crew had perished.

No Metars are available for SKVV, the local weather station reported at 08:00L light drizzle, temperature at 22 degrees C, dew point 21 degrees C, humidity 94%, winds from westnorthwest at 7kph (4 knots), Pressure 966 hPa. At 11:00L there were thunderstorms reported.

Colombia's Aerocivil released their preliminary report in Spanish reporting at 06:59L the aircraft had departed Villavicencia's runway 05, which operated according to visual flight rules however was in light rain, cleared for the VVC2A instrument departure. At 07:08L ATC noticed that the aircraft was turning left leaving the protection of the 15DME ARC around the VVC VOR. ATC inquired with the aircraft however did not receive a reply. At 07:09L radar contact was lost. At 07:19L ELT signals were received indicating three different locations of the aircraft, far apart from each other. Local residents discovered the aircraft on Jul 10th 2021 at position N4.2978 W73.6171 at an elevation of about 6000 feet MSL in rocky mountains covered with 10-15 meters(35-50 feet) high trees on a slope of about 60 degrees. The accident investigation commission arrived on scene on Jul 11th 2021.

The flight was to be a training flight, the aircraft was under the command of an instructor pilot (59, 16,973 hours total) and was flown by a student instructor pilot (53, 9,387 hours total). A maintenance technician (33) was also on board. The aircraft carried fuel for 3 hours.

First investigations determined the aircraft impacted terrain at a heading of 073 degrees at a low rate of descent and high forward speed. A post impact fire occurred.

The investigation reported the METAR around the time of the crash as:

SKVV 081200Z 04004KT 9999 VCSH BKN020 SCT090 22/21 Q1015 RMK VCSH/NE A2998=
SKVV 081300Z 30004KT 8000 -DZ BKN015 SCT090 22/21 Q1016 RMK A3002=

Colombia's Aerocivil released their final report in Spanish only (Editorial note: to serve the purpose of global prevention of the repeat of causes leading to an occurrence an additional timely release of all occurrence reports in the only world spanning aviation language English would be necessary, a Spanish only or no release does not achieve this purpose as set by ICAO annex 13 and just forces many aviators to waste much more time and effort each in trying to understand the circumstances leading to the occurrence. Aviators operating internationally are required to read/speak English besides their local language, investigators need to be able to read/write/speak English to communicate with their counterparts all around the globe).

The report concludes the probable causes of the crash were:

Controlled flight into terrain while performing the IFR VVC2A departure procedure, during which the crew turned left contrary to the procedure and headed towards the mountainous area of ​​the foothills of the eastern mountain range until impact.

Loss of situational awareness of the crew, who for reasons that could not be determined turned in an apparently controlled manner to the left contrary to what was indicated by the VVC2A departure procedure, even though it was an experienced crew familiar with the operation area.

Contributing Factors

Lack of operater standards, lacking an instruction plan and a detailed and clear syllabus so that the crew could follow in detail, organized and sequentially the techniques and procedures of each maneuver, such as for example, the VVC2A instrument procedure.

Lack of operator standards, lacking a specific syllabus for the planning and execution of the Recurrent Check, which took into account, among other aspects, the composition of the aircraft crew made up of two instructor pilots, one of whom was carrying out the checkup on the other.

Insufficient planning and supervision of the training flight by the operator, by not carrying out a specific analysis of the risks of the flight nor monitoring its preparation and execution, not providing details in a flight order or in another document nor by any other action, taking into account above all, the composition of the aircraft crew made up of two instructor pilots, one of whom was carrying out the check on the other.

Deficient planning and preparation of the flight by the crew by making an evidently informal change of the Flight Plan from VFR to IFR apparently not carrying out a complete and adequate briefing ignoring or not considering the VVC2A SID for the start of the IFR flight and skip several IFR flight procedures.

Disregard by the crew of the following procedures for IFR flight:

- Failure to specify an IFR route and departure procedure in the IFR Flight Plan.

and/or

- Failure to request complete authorization from ATC to initiate an IFR flight. At no time did he mention the VVC2A exit, key to the plan verbally proposed by them before takeoff.

and/or

- Did not define or request from the ATC what standard or other departure procedure they should follow to begin the IFR flight as they would encounter IMC shortly after takeoff.

and/or

- Do not require ATC to assign a transponder code before takeoff, or in any other phase of the flight, nor select code 2000 when you have not received instructions from the ATC unit to activate the transponder.

and/or

- Most likely, not activating the transponder before takeoff, and/or not verifying its correct operation before takeoff or immediately once the aircraft was in the air.

and/or

- Imprecise use of phraseology, with non-standard terminology, in its transmissions with the ATC.

Insufficient experience and training in IFR flights for the crew, since, despite their vast experience in the team, much of this had been forgotten in the eastern region of the country, where the vast majority of flights in the DC3 team were carried out in VMC and under VFR, without opportunity for the practical execution of IFR procedures.

Overconfidence of the crew, created by factors such as the high flight and DC3 team experience of the two pilots in the team; their status as team instructor pilots; the relative low operational demands of the flight mission; the knowledge, familiarization and confidence of the two crew members, with the characteristics of the aerodrome, the surrounding area and, especially, the peculiarities and risks of the terrain to the West of the takeoff trajectory.

Failure by air traffic control to comply with the following procedures related to the IFR flight that HK2820 began:

- Failure to issue a full clearance to the aircraft for IFR flight prior to the start of the flight, or at any other time.

and/or

- Failure to provide the aircraft with a standardized instrument departure clearance, SID, or some other safe departure procedure. At no time did ATC mention exit VVC2A, key to carrying out the plan verbally proposed by the crew.

and/or

- Do not provide the aircraft with a transponder code before takeoff, nor at any other appropriate time, nor verify its response, and begin this procedure only 03:11 min after takeoff of the aircraft, so that positive verification of radar contact is only possible. achieved 04:58 min after takeoff, thus delaying the presentation on the radar screen and limiting positive control of the flight.

and/or

- Carrying out the transfer of control of the aircraft from the Control Tower to Approach Control late (03:35 min after takeoff), and not doing it immediately after the aircraft was in the air, as it should have done, given that IMC flight meteorological conditions prevailed in the vicinity of the aerodrome.

and/or

- Operating with an incomplete configuration of the Approach Control radar screen, with insufficient symbology, which deprived the Control of references and elements of judgment to have a precise location of the aircraft and its turn to the left of the trajectory.

and/or

- Failure to observe radar surveillance techniques and procedures.

and/or

- Imprecise use of phraseology, with non-standard terminology, in their transmissions with the aircraft.

Lack of situational awareness, both on the part of the crew and ATC, in the face of a flight that perhaps because it may have seemed routine, led both parties to omit elementary procedures of an IFR flight, without considering the inherent risks of an operation in IMC conditions, with strict IFR procedures that had to be met, among other things, due to the proximity of the aerodrome to a mountainous area.
Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jul 8, 2021

Classification
Crash

Airline
Aliansa

Departure
Villavicencio, Colombia

Destination
Villavicencio, Colombia

Aircraft Registration
HK-2820

Aircraft Type
DOUGLAS DC-3

ICAO Type Designator
DC3

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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