Smartlynx A321 at London on Jul 22nd 2019, low on approach

Last Update: January 10, 2020 / 21:31:08 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jul 22, 2019

Classification
Report

Airline
Smartlynx

Flight number
MT-505

Departure
Dalaman, Turkey

Destination
London Stansted, United Kingdom

Aircraft Type
Airbus A321

ICAO Type Designator
A321

A Smartlynx Airbus A321-200 on behalf of Thomas Cook, registratio YL-LCQ performing flight MT-505 from Dalaman (Turkey) to London Stansted,EN (UK) with 211 passengers and 8 crew, was on approach to Stansted's runway 22, the threshold of which had been displaced due to works in progress, a revised RNAV procedure (RNAV22C) had been introduced, which was steeper based on the displaced threshold. The aircraft was observed lower than required over the works area and touched down near the displaced threshold.

The AAIB released their bulletin concluding the probable cause of the serious incident was:

Having read the relevant flight documentation paperwork, the pilots’ mindset was that the runway works at STN were not active during their approach. Confirmation bias appears to have played a part in the pilots’ selection of the wrong approach procedure and may have contributed to ATC not detecting the error. The reminder to follow PAPI indications was misinterpreted as an instruction to ignore them. The incident highlighted the importance of correct and complete radio transmission phraseology.

The AAIB described the sequence of events:

YL-LCQ was the first aircraft to make an approach to the airfield after the displaced threshold had been established on the evening of Monday 22 July 2019. The pilots did not realise that they were required to follow the RNAV22C procedure and flew the standard RNAV arrival anchored at THR 22. The Aerodrome Tower Controller thought that the aircraft looked "slightly lower than the traffic on final approach during the previous night’s reduced distance operation", but they were "not sure". As the aircraft approached 4 miles the controller issued landing clearance and added “caution, displaced threshold and reduced landing distance available…do not fly below papi indications”. The airline reported that their pilots had misinterpreted the controller’s instruction to "not fly below the PAPIs" as "do not follow the PAPIs".

The aircraft was seen to be lower than expected over the works area.

The crew did not see any obstructions on the runway and did not notice anything untoward during their approach and landing.

The AAIB analysed:

Radar data and eye witness testimony confirmed that YL-LCQ was lower than expected over the THR 22 works area at STN. The aircraft appeared to have touched down close to the displaced threshold. Flying the RNAV22C procedure would have placed YL-LCQ 50 ft higher over THR 22C and thus greater clearance over the works area would have been achieved.

An error in the temporary airfield chart available to them misled the pilots into thinking that the runway works were not active on the night of the incident. They planned for and flew a standard RNAV22 approach. Neither holding during the temporary runway closure nor ATC’s repeated references to reduced runway operations and the displaced threshold triggered a realisation that the works were taking place. The crew appeared to have exhibited a degree of confirmation bias; they were expecting a standard RNAV arrival and did not perceive the cues directing them to fly the alternative procedure.

While the controller consistently referred to the RNAV22C approach, the pilots of YL-LCQ replied with “rnav approach” to all bar the final approach clearance readback. The flight crew did not query or repeat the clearance to proceed direct to UPGIR, and ATC did not challenge their incomplete clearance readbacks. The pilot’s thick accent may have contributed to a slight lack of clarity in radio transmissions from the aircraft. Confirmation bias may also have influenced the terminal controller’s understanding of the flight crew’s intentions.

The tower controller advised the pilots to avoid flying below PAPI indications because the aircraft was low on the approach. The pilots were unaware that they were lower than anticipated, hence did not expect to be reminded to maintain the correct glidepath. They misinterpreted the controller and believed that they were to ignore PAPI indications.
Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jul 22, 2019

Classification
Report

Airline
Smartlynx

Flight number
MT-505

Departure
Dalaman, Turkey

Destination
London Stansted, United Kingdom

Aircraft Type
Airbus A321

ICAO Type Designator
A321

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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