Bek F100 at Almaty on Dec 27th 2019, lost height shortly after takeoff and impacted building after two tailstrikes
Last Update: September 13, 2022 / 14:16:47 GMT/Zulu time
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Dec 27, 2019
Classification
Accident
Airline
Bek Air
Flight number
Z9-2100
Departure
Almaty, Kazakhstan
Destination
Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan
Aircraft Registration
UP-F1007
Aircraft Type
Fokker 100
ICAO Type Designator
F100
Airport
Almaty Airport, Almaty
Airport ICAO Code
UAAA
Kazakhstan's President sent condolences to the families and relatives of those killed in the crash.
Almaty Airport reported the Bek Air flight crashed outside the airport and published a list of 60 names of survivors, who were distributed amongst several hospitals in Almaty. 14 bodies have been recovered so far. The condition of 22 of the survivors is described as "extremely critical". There were 95 passengers and 5 crew on board of the aircraft. Later the airport corrected that 12 people are confirmed dead as result of the accident (including the initial survivor).
Kazakhstan's Civil Aviation Authority reported the Air Operator's Certificate of Bek Air was suspended on Dec 27th 2019 following the accident. The accident aircraft had entered service on Apr 8th 1996, it's airworthiness certificate was last renewed on May 22nd 2019. The aircraft carried 93 passengers and 5 crew. The captain was 58 years old, the first officer 54 years, both pilots held ATPLs. 15 people have died as result of the accident so far. An investigation commission has been formed. Later the Ministry corrected that 12 people are confirmed dead as result of the accident (including the initial survivor). In the afternoon the CAA added, that 12 people died as result of the accident, 12 people (8 adults, 4 children) remain in hospital care (which indicates 74 people survived with no or minor injuries).
Kazakhstan's Ministry of Health reported a total of 66 people were taken to hospitals in Almaty, 50 of those were hospitalized, one of those died despite hospital care.
Kazakhstan's Ministry of Interior reported, the captain died as result of the accident.
Kazakhstan's Deputy Prime Minister reported preliminary results by the investigation commission suggests the aircraft struck its tail onto the runway surface twice with a distance of 300-400 meters in between. At the end of the runway the aircraft turned sharply right, the landing gear was retracted at this point already. The runway conditions were perfect however. The commission is looking into human error or technical reasons. The flight data and cockpit voice recorders have been recovered. The captain had died, the first officer is in hospital care with serious injuries.
On Jan 5th 2020 the hospital in Almaty reported the first officer has regained consciousness, is talking and answering questions adequately. He has been moved from intense care to a specialist department. In total 27 people including 7 children are still in hospital care in Almaty, three more are in hospital care at Nur-Sultan. One patient in Almaty and one in Nur-Sultan are still in intense care. All patients, including the ones in intense care, are stable. In total 22 surgeries had been performed.
A survivor reported the aircraft climbed a little bit began shaking then a collision occurred. Someone opened the emergency exit and the passenger got out. There were a lot of injuries (blood, broken arms and legs) and a number of fatalities around.
Another passenger reported the aircraft had just rotated and was beginning to gain altitude when the aircraft rolled left then right, then an impact occurred. The overwing exit was opened, they crawled out of the aircraft via an icy wing, everyone on the wing slipped on the wing, the passenges helped each other to get off the wing.
The pilot of an aircraft departing Almaty about 3 hours before the accident reported that during about 2 hours minimal white frost had developed on the slats and tanks of his aircraft, the rest of the wings was clean. However, other aircraft having parked overnight had accumulated significant ice. During departure, while climbing throuh 1000 feet AGL, a temperature inversion occurred with a temperature rise of about 11 degrees Centigrade.
On Dec 28th 2019 Kazakhstan's Deputy Prime Minister reported the black boxes are being sent to Moscow for read out by the MAK (Interstate Aviation Committee). Readout should commence on Dec 28th.
On Dec 28th 2019 Fokker announced they'll dispatch experts to Almaty to assist the investigation.
On Dec 28th 2019 noon the Dutch Safety Board announced, their investigators are on their way to participate in the international investigation into the accident of the Fokker 100.
On Dec 28th 2019 Kazakhstan's CAA announced a preliminary report is expected to be released on Jan 10th 2020. An expert of the MAK has arrived in Almaty on Dec 28th.
On Dec 28th 2019 a transcript of the ATC communication shows, communication with the aircraft was routine in Russian language until after departure, the aircraft was cleared for takeoff from runway 05R. After departure tower, now in English, cleared Air Astana flight 671 (KC-671), an Embraer ERJ-190 registration P4-KCK, to line up runway 05R, subsequently called the Fokker three times without a response and instructed KC-671 to hold position, the position of the Fokker was unknown, subsequently tower advised KC-671 that runway 05R was blocked due to emergency equipment.
On Dec 30th 2019 the airline reported in a press conference, that the captain (more than 21,000 hours total, more than 4,000 hours in command on type) was pilot flying, the first officer (more than 11,500 hours total, more than 5,000 hours on type) was pilot monitoring. The takeoff mass of the aircraft was 39,800 kg, thereof 6,100kg of fuel. The aircraft was configured at flaps 0 for departure. The captain decided only the elevators were to be de-iced. The aircraft departed runway 05R, engines and systems were all working normally. The aircraft rotated and became airborne at 07:20:36L at 148 KIAS. The aircraft reached a maximum height of 20 feet, rolled right to a bank angle of 5 degrees, rolled left to 18 degrees left bank angle and rolled right again to 14.5 degrees losing height, the pitch dropped from 16 degrees nose up to 4 degrees nose down and went up to 14.7 degrees nose up again, the aircraft contacted ground, climbed to 6 feet AGL again, pitch reduced to 5 degrees nose up, the aircraft descended to the ground again, speed decaying reaching 129 KIAS, while on the ground the airspeed recovered again to 148 KIAS, the pitch increased 19.6 degrees, the aircraft climbed to 11 feet AGL, the gear was retracted, the aircraft lost speed again reaching 130 KIAS, pitch dropped 1.6 degrees nose down and the aircraft impacted ground a last time.
On Jan 2nd 2020 The Aviation Herald received data of a weather sounding, that was done on Dec 27th 2019 00:00Z confirming the pilot observation of a significant temperature inversion. The data reported -12.3 degrees C 84% relative humidity RH (=1.34g water/kg air) at ground level, -9.5 degrees C 81% RH (=1.63g/kg) at 400 feet AGL, -2.3 degrees C 69% RH (=2.44g/kg) at 900 feet AGL, +5.0 degrees C 56% RH (=3.49g/kg) at 1700 feet AGL and reached a maximum temperature of +7.0 degrees C 16% RH (=1.19g/kg) at 2500 feet AGL. The meteorologist concludes referencing the conditions at the ground: "The cold temperature and high RH are perfect for icing." The sounding on Dec 26th 2019 00:00Z shows a similiar inversion of -13.7 degrees C 86% RH (=1.21g/kg) at the ground and a maximum of +4.8 degrees C 56% RH (=3.47g/kg) at 2200 feet AGL.
On Jan 2nd 2020 4 surveillance videos surfaced from various cameras. Part 1 (camera about mid of runway) shows the commencement of takeoff, first climb and descent (starting at about 1:20 minutes into the video), part 2 (camera further down the runway) shows first climb, descent and subsequently struggle to become airborne again (starting about 00:40 minutes into the recording), part 3 (camera near the final position) shows the aircraft past the runway on the ground without gear colliding with street lights and the concrete wall (starting about 1:30 minutes into the recording), part 4 (camera opposite side of runway) shows the takeoff, first climb and descent (starting about 1:10 minutes into the recording) in the background.
On Jan 6th 2020 the airline held another press conference and released a diagram of additional FDR parameters. The parameters are from top to bottom (no units are provided): Aileron position, Bank Angle, rudder position, heading, elevator position, stabilizer position, pitch, angle of attack, speed, height, N1 left engine, N1 right engine, wind direction and windspeed. (Editorial note: it is interesting to observe that at second 33 to 34 the IAS jumps from 0 to 148 knots according to this graph). In the press conference the airline re-iterated the aircraft had been parked at Almaty for two days, there had been no rainfall during that time. Before departure all necessary procedures were carried out, the stabilizers were de-iced, the wings were not processed as they were clean. After the first lift off the aircraft climbed to about 5.5 meters, the speed decayed, the AoA increased, however the aircraft descended onto the ground again. The takeoff was continued (editorial note: the temporary decrease in both engine N1s is not being explained), the aircraft becomes airborne a second time and again sinks down to the ground, the aircraft becomes airborne a third time near the end of the runway, the captain instructs gear up, the first officer complies, but the aircraft again descends to the ground now with the gear almost retracted, the aircraft glides with its belly on snow over a distance of about 750 meters and collided with the fence and house. According to computations the aircraft would have needed 800 meters to come to a stop. The speed at impact with the fence was about 50-55 kph (27-30 knots). The wind data in the diagram were retrieved from the black boxes and in seconds 69 and 70 show wind speeds of 96 knots, catastrophic values which prompted the airline to conclude this was the vortex of wake turbulence.
Editorial notes: while on the ground the wind measurement by the aircraft systems does not work with any reliability whatsoever, the aircraft was on the ground at that time, the bank angle changed while already skidding on the belly which can explain these values. According to METARs the wind was blowing from 100 to 140 degrees magnetic between 1 and 2 meters/seconds (2-4 knots). The previous departure departed 112 seconds prior to the Fokker 100. Assuming the wind came from 100 degrees during that entire time and thus at an angle of 50 degrees to the runway heading and was blowing at 1 meter/second, any wake turbulence vortices by the previous departure would have been blown left off the runway center line by a minimum of 85 meters (runway width 45 meters) and would have been left off the runway therefore, assuming a wind from 140 degrees at 2 meters/second the wake vortices would have been blown left off the runway center line by 224 meters. Using the wind data off the enhanced FDR diagram while the aircraft was airborne, the aircraft measured the wind from 155 degrees at 6 knots during the first liftoff, from 161 degrees between 5 and 7 knots during the second liftoff and from 132 degrees at 6 knots during the last liftoff. These values would result in the wake vortices blown left off the runway center line by more than 300 meters.
On Jan 10th 2020 the investigation commission held a press conference stating, that both cockpit voice and flight data recorders have been successfully read out. First preliminary results point into the direction of icing as most probable cause. The captain was pilot flying, the first officer pilot monitoring. Prior to departure de-icing was only partially applied, the commander decided to not de-ice the wings. There were no aircraft or aircraft system failures, all aircraft systems operated normally. After commencing takeoff the aircraft became airborne but began to roll left and right, the left wing tip touched the runway. The aircraft sank back onto the runway. The first officer called to reject takeoff and retarted the thrust levers, the captain called "no need", advanced thrust levers and continued takeoff stating "Let's go, Let's go!". About 7 seconds later the commander instructs gear up, in the following the aircraft touched the runway 6 times with the tail, 4 times with the landing gear and one time with the wing. Mass and balance was within limits, the wind was stable blowing to the left of the runway, a special situation thus could not have developed on the runway, any wake turbulence from the preceding departure about 110 seconds prior to the Fokker 100 was blown to the left of the runway, therefore icing is the main theory. There are parallels with accidents in France 2007, see Report: Regional F100 at Pau Pyrenees on Jan 25th 2007, crashed on take off due to contaminated wings as well as an accident in Skopje 1993 (Pal Air F100 PH-KXL taking the lives of 83 of 102 people due to loss of roll control as result of ice contaminated wings).
On Jan 13th 2020 the Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK, also known as IAC) reported they take an active part in the investigation with Kazakhstan's governmental Accident Investigation Commission providing scientific and technical support to the investigation from the first days after the accident. The cockpit voice and flight data recorders were successfully read out, all data were transferred to the investigation commission. A preliminary analysis of this information permitted to conclude on the sequence of events and determine a preliminary theory of the causes of the accident. These were communicated to the public in a press conference on Jan 10th 2020. The investigation commission, in consultation with specialists from Netherlands, Kazakhstan and EASA, began work on mathematically modelling of the flight in order to establish the actual aerodymanic characteristics of the aircraft during the accident takeoff and the influence of external factors, primarily ground icing.
On Jan 20th 2020 Kazakhstan's CAA reported that examination of the airline found a number of severe violations with respect to the airworthiness of their fleet, the condition of which was generally described as poor. The CAA reported amongst others: "Coupled with this, the most serious safety finding is that Bek Air has removed component data plates. These data plates have serial numbers to help track hours and cycles. This practice means the identity of engines can no longer be verified and that hours and cycles attributed to that engine no longer provable. Several engines with this problem have been identified, which casts doubt on all aircraft engines operated by Bek Air. In addition, Rolls Royce, the manufacturer of the Fokker-100 aircraft engines, reported that they have received no information about the overhaul of these engines since these aircraft were put into operation in Kazakhstan. Rolls Royce also further informed the Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan JSC that there is no procedure which would require the removal of a data plate, nor would Rolls Royce authorize such a procedure." The CAA wrote with respect to the accident:
During the inspection of video evidence at Almaty Airport, it was discovered that the Bek Air Crews usually do not conduct a walk-around, or a wing check as instructed and required in the Bek Air’s operations manual.
In the Fokker 28-100 aircraft operations manual, it clearly states that the aircraft wing MUST be checked prior to each flight and, unusually for aircraft of this type, the manual specifies how this check must be done. This procedure was introduced as an airworthiness directive after the 1993 crash in Skopje, Macedonia. The clean wing check requires a tactile check of the wing at three points along the leading edge on the upper surface, the lower surface and the front of the wing. The manual states that if there is ice present, then the all critical surfaces must be de-iced. Reviews of video footage of preparations of Bek Air aircraft do not show that this check was ever completed.
Training records show no evidence of winter operations training being conducted. No training syllabus was produced to show that crews are trained to identify and treat ice risks for this type of aircraft.
On Jan 28th 2020 Almaty's Health Department announced, that the first officer of the flight has died. The first officer had regained consciousness on Jan 5th 2020, left intensive care and was treated in a special department. On Jan 21st 2020 he had been discharged into home care. An emergency call was received from his home on Jan 28th 2020 reporting rapid deterioration of his condition, emergency services rapidly arrived on scene, found the first officer was suffering from cardiac arrest and attempted resuscitation, however, to no avail.
On Feb 19th 2020 Kazakhstan's Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development held a press conference during which a video created by the Interstate Aviation Committee based on the FDR and CVR data of the Bek Air Fokker 100 about the accident sequence was presented (see below).
ADS-B Data transmitted by the aircraft's transponder suggest the aircraft became airborne, climbed only to between 50 and 100 feet AGL, veered right and impacted buildings abeam of the runway about 3000 meters/10,000 feet down the runway 05R. Photographic evidence puts the final position to the right of the runway center line and about 750 meters/2500 feet past the end of the runway (4400 meters/14,400 feet length).
The occurrence aircraft had arrived in Almaty on Dec 25th 2019 at 18:20Z and had not flown until the accident flight.
In September 2022 the final report in Kazakh only dated Apr 29th 2022 was discovered (Editorial note: to serve the purpose of global prevention of the repeat of causes leading to an occurrence an additional timely release of all occurrence reports in the only world spanning aviation language English would be necessary, a Kazakh only release does not achieve this purpose as set by ICAO annex 13 and just forces many aviators to waste much more time and effort each in trying to understand the circumstances leading to the occurrence. Aviators operating internationally are required to read/speak English besides their local language, investigators need to be able to read/write/speak English to communicate with their counterparts all around the globe).
The investigation concludes the probable causes of the crash (the report calls it a "catastrophe") were:
The accident occurred as result of asymmetrical loss of wing load-bearing properties during the takeoff phase which caused the aircraft to stall immediately after taking off from the runway.
The aircraft collapsed immediately after leaving the runway and rolled to the right on snow covered ground, breached the airport perimeter fence and collided with a private two story building about 10 meters from the fence.
As result of the collision, due to overloading andimpact destruction and compression occurred resulting in 11 passengers and one member of the crew being killed and 47 passengers being injured in various ways.
The cause of the loss of load-bearing properties of the wings was most likely the effect of icing on the ground.
Contributing factors were:
The crew, after analysing the meteorological situation of Almaty Airport, may not have made sufficient conclusions for a more effective inspection of the entire aircraft and especially (tactile method) an examination of the leading edges of the wings.
The operators Safety Management System (SMS) only contains general provisions, specific measures were not adapted for implementation. This did not allow for timely identification and elimination of existing risks affecting the safety of flight.
Collision of the aircraft with a two story building which affected the severity of the consequences.
Metars:
UAAA 270230Z 21002MPS 1100 R05L/1100D BR FU NSC M11/M13 Q1014 R05L/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 270200Z 18002MPS 1000 R05L/1400N R05R/1600U BR FU NSC M11/M13 Q1014 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 270130Z 10002MPS 1000 R05L/P2000 R05R/P2000U BR FU NSC M12/M13 Q1014 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 270100Z 14001MPS 1000 R05L/P2000N R05R/P2000D BR FU NSC M12/M13 Q1014 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 270030Z 17002MPS 1100 R05L/P2000D R05R/P2000U BR FU NSC M12/M13 Q1015 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 270000Z 09001MPS 1300 R05L/P2000N R05R/P2000N BR FU NSC M11/M12 Q1015 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 270000Z 09001MPS 1300 R05L/P2000N R05R/P2000N BR FU NSC M11/M12 Q1015 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 262330Z 20002MPS 1400 R05L/P2000U R05R/P2000D BR FU NSC M10/M12 Q1015 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 262300Z 20002MPS 1200 R05L/P2000U R05R/P2000N BR FU NSC M10/M11 Q1016 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 262230Z 22002MPS 1100 R05L/P2000 R05R/P2000U BR FU FEW200 M11/M13 Q1016 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 262200Z 20002MPS 140V220 1100 R05L/P2000 R05R/P2000U BR FU FEW200 M11/M13 Q1017 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 262130Z 18002MPS 1100 R05L/P2000 R05R/P2000U BR FU FEW200 M11/M13 Q1017 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 262100Z VRB01MPS 1100 R05L/P2000 R05R/P2000D BR FU SCT200 M11/M13 Q1017 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 262030Z 21002MPS 0700 R23R/P2000D R23L/1800N FU BR SCT200 M11/M13 Q1017 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 262000Z 16002MPS 0650 R23R/P2000D R23L/1700U FU BR SCT200 M11/M13 Q1018 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261930Z 20003MPS 0500 R23R/1800N R23L/1400U FU BR SCT200 M11/M12 Q1018 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261900Z 00000MPS 0500 R23R/P2000U R23L/1400N FU BR SCT200 M11/M12 Q1018 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261830Z 14002MPS 0500 R23R/1400N R23L/1400N FU BR SCT200 M10/M12 Q1019 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261800Z 20002MPS 0400 R23R/1300U R23L/1200N FU BR SCT200 M11/M12 Q1019 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261730Z VRB01MPS 0350 R23R/1300N R23L/1100D FU BR SCT200 M10/M12 Q1020 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261700Z VRB01MPS 0300 R05L/1000N R05R/1100N FU BR SCT200 M11/M12 Q1020 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261630Z 17001MPS 0350 R05L/1200N R05R/1100N BR FU SCT200 M10/M12 Q1020 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261600Z VRB01MPS 0400 R05L/1300N R05R/1200N BR FU SCT200 M09/M11 Q1021 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261530Z 18002MPS 0400 R05L/1300D R05R/1200N BR FU SCT200 M09/M11 Q1021 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261500Z 20001MPS 0450 R05L/1400N R05R/1300N BR FU SCT200 M10/M12 Q1022 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261430Z 16001MPS 0650 R05L/1900N R05R/1700N BR FU SCT200 M09/M11 Q1022 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261400Z 16002MPS 0600 R05L/1900N R05R/1600N BR FU SCT200 M09/M12 Q1022 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261330Z 00000MPS 1000 R05L/P2000U R05R/P2000N BR FU FEW200 M09/M12 Q1022 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261300Z 00000MPS 1000 R05L/P2000D R05R/P2000N BR FU FEW200 M09/M11 Q1022 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261230Z 00000MPS 1100 R05L/P2000N R05R/P2000U BR FU FEW200 M09/M11 Q1022 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261200Z 06002MPS 2200 BR FU SCT200 M08/M11 Q1022 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261130Z VRB01MPS 2500 BR FU SCT200 M07/M12 Q1023 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261100Z VRB01MPS 2900 FU SCT200 M07/M11 Q1023 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261030Z 01001MPS 2800 FU SCT200 M06/M11 Q1023 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 261000Z 02002MPS 2500 FU SCT200 M06/M11 Q1023 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260930Z 36002MPS 2500 FU SCT200 M06/M11 Q1023 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260900Z 01002MPS 5000 FU SCT200 M05/M10 Q1023 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260830Z 02003MPS 5000 FU SCT200 M04/M10 Q1023 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260800Z 04002MPS 5000 FU SCT200 M05/M11 Q1023 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260730Z VRB01MPS 5000 FU SCT200 M04/M11 Q1023 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260700Z VRB01MPS 5000 FU SCT200 M04/M11 Q1024 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260630Z 03002MPS 3500 FU FEW100 BKN200 M06/M11 Q1024 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260600Z 04001MPS 3000 FU FEW100 BKN200 M06/M12 Q1025 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260530Z 03003MPS 2500 BR FU FEW100 BKN200 M08/M12 Q1025 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260500Z VRB01MPS 1800 R05L/1800N R05R/P2000N BR FU FEW100 BKN200 M07/M11 Q1026 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260430Z 28002MPS 1500 R05L/1500U R05R/1800U BR FU FEW100 BKN200 M09/M12 Q1026 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260400Z 15002MPS 1100 R05L/1100U R05R/1300N BR FU FEW100 SCT200 M10/M13 Q1026 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260330Z VRB01MPS 1500 R05L/1500N R05R/1700U BR FU FEW100 SCT200 M12/M13 Q1026 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260300Z 31002MPS 280V340 1400 R05L/1400N R05R/1700U BR FU FEW100 SCT200 M13/M15 Q1026 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260230Z 16003MPS 1200 R05L/1200 R05R/1200D BR FU FEW100 SCT200 M13/M14 Q1026 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260200Z 03001MPS 1300 R05L/1500D R05R/1300D BR FU FEW100 M13/M14 Q1026 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260130Z VRB01MPS 1000 R05L/P2000 R05R/P2000N BR FU FEW100 M13/M14 Q1026 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260100Z 19003MPS 1300 R05L/P2000U R05R/P2000U BR SCT100 M13/M14 Q1026 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260030Z 18002MPS 1500 R05L/P2000 R05R/P2000D BR SCT100 M13/M14 Q1026 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260000Z VRB01MPS 1300 R05L/P2000U R05R/P2000N BR SCT100 M13/M15 Q1026 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 260000Z VRB01MPS 1300 R05L/P2000U R05R/P2000N BR SCT100 M13/M15 Q1026 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 252330Z VRB01MPS 1800 R23R/P2000U R23L/P2000 BR SCT100 M13/M14 Q1026 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 252300Z 29001MPS 1400 R23R/P2000U R23L/P2000U BR SCT100 M13/M15 Q1026 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 252230Z VRB01MPS 1400 R23R/P2000N R23L/P2000U BR SCT100 M13/M15 Q1026 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
UAAA 252200Z 18003MPS 1500 R23R/P2000N R23L/P2000D BR FU SCT100 M12/M13 Q1027 R88/91//50 NOSIG=
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Dec 27, 2019
Classification
Accident
Airline
Bek Air
Flight number
Z9-2100
Departure
Almaty, Kazakhstan
Destination
Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan
Aircraft Registration
UP-F1007
Aircraft Type
Fokker 100
ICAO Type Designator
F100
Airport
Almaty Airport, Almaty
Airport ICAO Code
UAAA
This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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