Avianca AT72 at Manizales on Sep 7th 2019, tail strike on landing

Last Update: January 13, 2021 / 20:56:16 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Sep 7, 2019

Classification
Accident

Cause
Tail strike on landing

Airline
Avianca

Flight number
AV-4852

Departure
Bogota, Colombia

Destination
Manizales, Colombia

Aircraft Registration
HK-5041

Aircraft Type
ATR ATR-72-200

ICAO Type Designator
AT72

Airport
La Nubia Airport, Manizales

Airport ICAO Code
SKMZ

An Avianca Avions de Transport Regional ATR-72-212A, registration HK-5041 performing flight AV-4852 from Bogota to Manizales (Colombia) with 49 passengers and 5 crew, landed on Manizales' La Nubia Airport's runway 10 at about 11:00L (16:00Z) but struck its tail onto the runway surface and bounced. The aircraft rolled out and taxied to the apron. There were no injuries, the aircraft received substantial damage however.

On Sep 12th 2019 Colombia's GRIAA reported according to first initial statements the aircraft was on short final when the aircraft suddenly sank onto the threshold causing a hard landing and a tail strike. The aircraft landed and taxied to the apron. The aircraft received structural damage. The highest level of injury was provided as "minor", the aircraft damage was substantial. The occurrence was rated an accident and is being investigated.

Colombia's GRIAA released their final report in Spanish only (Editorial note: to serve the purpose of global prevention of the repeat of causes leading to an occurrence an additional timely release of all occurrence reports in the only world spanning aviation language English would be necessary, a Spanish only release does not achieve this purpose as set by ICAO annex 13 and just forces many aviators to waste much more time and effort each in trying to understand the circumstances leading to the occurrence. Aviators operating internationally are required to read/speak English besides their local language, investigators need to be able to read/write/speak English to communicate with their counterparts all around the globe).

The GRIAA concluded the probable causes of the accident were:

Abnormal runway contact, consisting of the strike of the lower aft section of the fuselage against the runway surface during landing.

The aircraft pitched down, induced by the crew, at about 100 feet AGL plus a reduction in engine torque to about 3%, which generated a gradual loss of height and loss of lift in the final phase of the approach and a hard contact with the runway. The aircraft pitched upwards, induced by the crew, above +9.4 degrees nose up due to the loss of height in the last segment of approach producing the tail strike.

Contributing factor was the tail wind conditions at the time of the landing and the high altitude of the aerodrome, which increased speed over ground of the aircraft.

The GRIAA reported the captain (44, ATPL, 4,763 hours total, 201 hours on type) was pilot flying, the first officer (29, CPL, 4,296 hours total, 230 hours on type) was pilot monitoring.

The crew set flaps 30 for the approach to runway 10, at 7800 feet MSL (1000 feet AGL) gear was down and flaps at the commanded 30 degrees position, the aircraft was doing 109 KIAS, the winds came from 255 degrees at 9 knots.

The aircraft crossed 170 feet AGL at 105 KIAS, sink rate was 400 fpm, engine #1 was at 33% torque, engine #2 at 32% torque, winds from 264 degrees at 9 knots.

At 19 feet AGL the left engine was at 4% torque, the right engine at 3% torque, the rate of descent was 480 fpm.

With the winds from 264 degrees at 10 knots the aircraft touched down at 600 fpm rate of descent with the main gear, developed a vertical acceleration of +2.73G and bounced resulting in a tail strike. The captain controlled the aircraft further during the roll out, vacated the runway via taxiway A and taxied to the apron, where passengers disembarked normally.

Substantial structural damage to the aft fuselage was detected, the GRIAA rated the occurrence an accident therefore.

The GRIAA reported that as result of the hard landing a jump seat occupied by a member of the cabin crew detached from its anchor point causing minor injuries to the cabin crew member. No other injuries occurred.

The GRIAA analysed the commander had extensive experience on single engine and multi engine aircraft, however, had only accumulated 201 hours on the ATR considered to be low operational experience.

Descending through 200 feet the aircraft was fully aligned with the runway, on descent path at 105 KIAS with Vref at 104 KIAS, the weather was stable, the approach was stable.

At 100 feet AGL the pitch reduced to 0.5 degrees nose down, the aircraft began to accelerate the rate of descent at a vertical acceleration of +0.8G. At 30 feet AGL the elevator moved to -17 degrees (three quarters of deflection nose up), the pitch increased now to +9.4 degrees nose up at a vertical acceleration of +1.5G, the rate of descent began to decrease at 10 feet AGL reducing from 700 fpm. The aircraft touched down at 9.4 degrees nose up, 101 KIAS, 128 knots over ground and +2.7G, the gear indicated compressed briefly, the aircraft experienced -0.6G and the aircraft bounced. The elevators were moved nose down and the power was increased resulting in a takeoff configuration warning. The aircraft touched down a second time at +1.7G, 100 KIAS, 126 knots over ground and 2.1 degrees nose down pitch. Based on the pitch the second touchdown likely was nose gear first. The aircraft bounced a second time, the captain now pulled the control column, the aircraft touched down a third time at 2.4 degrees nose up pitch at 96 KIAS and +2.0G. The third touchdown was again on the main gear, dual control inputs were observed with the captain pushing the nose down and first officer pulling the nose up. The aircraft bounced once again, touched down again a 4th time, this time the power levers were pulled to idle, touchdown occurred at 0.8 degrees nose down at 91 KIAS at +1.5G. The attitude was near the attitude in which all landing gear struts would touch down at the same time.

The operator's SMS data did not show any trend of deviations with crew of low experience in execution of the procedures at critical airfields. The operator provided necessary training and demanded compliance with the prerequisites operating into such airfields and conducted oversight. This is why the GRIAA considers this area of the operator remained an adequate and solid defense against such accidents.

Metars:
SKMZ 071800Z 33004KT 9999 BKN080 22/14 A3027 RMK HZ/W=
SKMZ 071700Z 31007KT 9999 SCT050 21/13 A3032 RMK HZ/W=
SKMZ 071600Z 26005KT 9999 SCT040 21/12 A3033 RMK HZ/W=
SKMZ 071500Z 31005KT 9999 SCT050 20/13 A3034 RMK HZ/W=
SKMZ 071400Z 29004KT 9999 SCT050 19/12 A3035 RMK HZ/W=
SKMZ 071300Z 00000KT 9999 NSC 18/11 A3035 RMK HZ/W=
SKMZ 071200Z 10004KT 9999 NSC 14/10 A3033 RMK HZ/W=