Cathay Pacific B773 near Hong Kong on Jan 26th 2019, captain incapacitated

Last Update: August 23, 2023 / 18:42:15 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Cathay Pacific B-HNP, Boeing 777-300 — Cathay Pacific B-HNP, Boeing 777-300 (Photo credit: masak2_ukon / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jan 26, 2019

Classification
Incident

Cause
Captain incapacitated

Airline
Cathay Pacific

Flight number
CX-583

Departure
Sapporo, Japan

Destination
Hong Kong, China

Aircraft Registration
B-HNP

Aircraft Type
Boeing 777-300

ICAO Type Designator
B773

A Cathay Pacific Boeing 777-300, registration B-HNP performing flight CX-583 from Sapporo (Japan) to Hong Kong (China) with 348 passengers and 16 crew, was enroute at FL380 about one hour prior to estimated arrival when the first officer declared PAN PAN reporting the captain had become incapacitated. The aircraft continued to Hong Kong for a safe landing on runway 07L about one hour later, emergency services were on stand by. The captain was taken to a hospital by an ambulance awaiting the aircraft.

On Apr 24th 2019 Hong Kong's AAIA released their preliminary report stating the captain (ATPL, 27,500 hours total, 4,000 hours on type in command) had suddenly lost visual acuity, relinquished control of the aircraft to the first officer, moved his seat full aft and secured the shoulder harness to ensure no interference with the flight controls. The first officer informed ATC, declared PAN PAN, requested a priority approach to Hong Kong and continued for a safe landing in Hong Kong.

The captain remained fully conscious and instructed the purser to contact medical advisory services for immediate medical assistance and instructed the first officer to inform the operator's dispatch about the pilot incapacitation and reversion to single pilot. Medical advice was offered and helped to improve the captain's condition. After landing the captain was assisted by paramedics.

On Aug 23rd 2023 the AAIA released their final report concluding the probable cause of the incident (reclassified as incident rather than serious incident) was:

The Captain experienced a loss of focus in both eyes and the situation continued to deteriorate.

The AAIA analysed:

The CN experienced a loss of focus in both eyes and declared his obvious incapacitation shortly thereafter. He enacted the NNC procedures, and advised the FO to take over the aircraft, communicate with the IOC and make a PAN-PAN call to ATC to indicate a state of urgency requiring a priority approach. Therefore, the FO, with the assistance from the cabin crew and ATC, had an early opportunity to maintain control of the aircraft, take care of the CN, and re-organise the flight deck work and land the aircraft.

When the CN declared incapacitated, the FO was the PF and the autopilot system was kept engaged. There was no immediate threat to the control of the aircraft. Optimal use of the autopilot is mandated by airlines as SOPs and it is also one of the steps in the NNC of Pilot Incapacitation. The autopilot system could also autoland the aircraft if required.

The FO did not opt to divert to Taipei because it was the CN’s last command before he declared he was incapacitated. When the CN declared pilot incapacitation, the aircraft was about 147 nautical miles from Taipei and 304 nautical miles from Hong Kong. Taking into consideration of the flight phase, routes (U-turn to Taipei versus enroute to Hong Kong), time taken for negotiating a re-clearance with Taipei ATC, aircraft conditions, meteorological conditions, the CN’s medical situation, etc., the FO’s assessment of the contingency options and the decision to continue to home base is considered appropriate.

According to the FO, the SP read out ACARS messages from the IOC to the CN, and acknowledged each of the FO’s messages and relayed them to the cabin. The SP alleviated the workload of the FO on communication.

The FO used the electronic checklists as per the SOP with the Senior Purser available to read out the paper checklist if required, as he considered that the electronic checklists were obvious enough for him to follow. Since the normal ECLs are automatically displayed in the proper sequence for each phase of flight, it is highly unlikely for a pilot to skip a checklist. Open loop checklist items require pilots to acknowledge each step in a sequence.

Closed loop checklist items are tied via sensors to certain aircraft functions and states. They will not allow a pilot to bypass a step until it is addressed. By having checklists available at the touch of a button, crewmembers, when faced with unexpected situations, have the proper checklists for emergency procedures available.

ATC prioritised the approach of the flight and instructed them to descend for a high speed approach to Hong Kong. The communication of the flight with the enroute and terminal ATC units was effective and the ATC instructions were precise, simple and direct.

There was no evidence indicating that the FO had any difficulty in dealing with the situation and continuation of the flight. Adhering to the SOP and making the best use of the assistance and resources from ATC, cabin crew, and aircraft automation reduced the complexity and workload for the FO.

The aircraft was landed safely and taxied to the arrival gate behind a Follow Me car with no further events. The situation was under control of the FO.

The flight crew and cabin crew complied with the operational aspects of company procedures, policy, and guidance during the descent, approach, and landing.