Astana A320 at Astana on May 22nd 2018, temporary runway excursion on landing

Last Update: February 22, 2020 / 17:40:21 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Air Astana P4-KBB, Airbus A320 — Air Astana P4-KBB, Airbus A320 (Photo credit: Anna Zvereva / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
May 22, 2018

Classification
Incident

Airline
Air Astana

Flight number
KC-352

Departure
Shymkent, Kazakhstan

Destination
Astana, Kazakhstan

Aircraft Registration
P4-KBB

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320

ICAO Type Designator
A320

Airport
Astana International Airport, Astana

Airport ICAO Code
UACC

An Air Astana Airbus A320-200, registration P4-KBB performing flight KC-352 from Shymkent to Astana (Kazakhstan) with 88 passengers and 9 crew, landed on Astana's runway 22 at 13:22L (07:22Z) but went right off the runway temporarily, crossed taxiways B and C and returned onto the center line of the runway. There were no injuries, the aircraft sustained damage to the left hand engine inlet.

Thunderstorms associated with winds gusting up to 49 knots were battering the city at that time causing a building crane to collapse, houses being unroofed and about 20 people on the ground being injured.

Kazakhstan's Civil Aviation Department reported the aircraft went off the runway during roll out at 13:22L. The aircraft was towed to the apron. The airport was closed for about 40 minutes as result.

On Oct 18th 2018 Germany's BFU reported the left hand engine inlet and low pressure compressor were damaged when the aircraft exited the runway. The responsible pilot is German citizen, the BFU was therefore informed and joined the investigation.

Kazakhstan's AIIO released their final report in Russian only (Editorial note: to serve the purpose of global prevention of the repeat of causes leading to an occurrence an additional timely release of all occurrence reports in the only world spanning aviation language English would be necessary, a Russian only release does not achieve this purpose as set by ICAO annex 13 and just forces many aviators to waste much more time and effort each in trying to understand the circumstances leading to the occurrence. Aviators operating internationally are required to read/speak English besides their local language, investigators need to be able to read/write/speak English to communicate with their counterparts all around the globe).

The report concludes the probable cause of the serious incident was:

the main cause was the airplane landing with a strong crosswind from 311 degrees and windspeed of 22m/s (43 knots) and a subsequent sharp decrease of windspeed to 6 m/s (12 knots) immediately after touch down. As the aircraft was configured to compensate for the strong crosswind, it showed a tendency to veer to the right of the runway in those sharply reduced wind conditions, the crew failed to correct and permitted the aircraft to roll out of the runway.

Contributing factors were:

- the crew ignored a wind shear warning as well as the tower's advice of strong crosswind out of range and failed to go around.

- self-confident and lack of preparedness for flying in such conditions by the aircraft commander

- poor preflight preparation by the crew

- insufficient level of interaction between crew (CRM)

The AIIO reported in Shymkent the crew reviewed current weather, weather forecasts, NOTAMs for the destination as well as alternate airfields and "justifyably" took the decision to depart for the flight.

Following an uneventful flight the aircraft touched down on runway 22, for a brief moment maintained runway heading but began to veer to the right about 400-500 meters past the runway threshold, departed the runway to the right 750 meters past the runway threshold, damaged three runway information signs, crossed taxiways B and C off the runway and returned onto the runway about 1750 meters past the runway threshold and joined the runway center line 2100 meters past the runway threshold. The aircraft susequently taxied to the apron, where the passengers disembarked normally.

The captain (54, ATPL, 11,982 hours total, 6,117 hours on type thereof 4,512 hours in command) was pilot flying, the first officer (39, ATPL, 4,617 hours total, 4,380 hours on type) was pilot monitoring.

The AIIO analysed that Astana Aerodrome was experiencing dangerous weather conditions before and after the serious incident, which consisted of strong crosswings of 17 m/s (33 knots) gusting up to 22-24m/s (43-45 knots) with wind directions between 270 and 300 degrees, which were beyond the limits of the aircraft.

The AIIO analysed that the flight was uneventful until approach to Astana. While descending towards Astana the crew was advised the weather at Astana had winds from 270 degrees at 11m/s (22 knots) gusting up to 17m/s (34 knots), a thunderstorm was near the airport, cloud ceilig was 900 meters. The crew joined final approach and configured for landing, tower reported the winds were changing now coming from 280 degrees varying between 11 and 16 m/s gusting 17 to 21 m/s. The controller subsequently cleared the aircraft to land on runway 22. Tower subsequently advised the winds had further changed now coming from 300 degrees at 16 m/s gusting up to 22 m/s. About 20 seconds after that transmission the crew disconnected the autopilot and touched down on runway 22 about 45 seconds after that transmission with a heading of 227 degrees, 12 degrees to the right of the runway track (runway track at 215 degrees). The left main gear touched down first followed by the right main gear about a second later. At the point of touch down the aircraft was flown to compensate for a 43 knots crosswind: 7.8 degrees drift angle, 0.7 degrees left bank, pitch 4.5 degrees nose up, 120 fpm rate of descent, 139 KIAS.

Immediately after touch down a sharp wind shear occurred: the wind, while maintaining direction from 311 degrees, reduced from 22 to 6m/s.

According to the FDR the crew applied some left rudder pedal input of about 2 degrees until touch down, then the left pedal deflected to 23-30 degrees, the left pedal brakes were activated at 7-16 degrees. However, subsequently the right pedal brakes were activated at about 40 degrees, as result a larger brakes pressure developed on the right brakes causing the aircraft to experience an additional right yaw moment. This significant difference between the brake pedal pressures can only be explained by the incorrect adjustment of the captain's seat and pedals not providing sufficient and uniform footwork for brakes handling.

As result the aircraft sustained runway heading immediately after touchdown, the thrust reversers activated (but did not contrinute to the developing scenario), then turned right, began to veer right about 400-500 meters past the runway threshold and exited the runway 750 meters past the runway threshold at a speed of at least 108 KIAS. While the aircraft rolled right of the runway crossing two taxiways and taking down three runway signs the speed decreased from 108 to 53 KIAS, the crew stowed the thrust reversers, the aircraft returned onto the runway 1750 meters past the threshold.

The AIIO analysed that the dry and hard surface of the side strip of the runway had a positive effect on the outcome so that the wheels did not sink in. There had been no precipitation 10 days before the serios incident.

The AIIO analysed that the crew had sufficient time to recognize from the last wind data received by tower, that the winds were exceeding their cross wind limits and to initiate a go around. The continuation of the landing thus violated the crews' and the aircraft's wind limitations as well as the limitations provided in the aircraft operating manual (for the dry runway the limit including gusts was provided at 33 knots or 17m/s).

The AIIO also analysed that 40 seconds prior to tower transmitting the last wind information an aural warning occurred inside the cockpit: "Go Around! Wind Shear Ahead!" The first officer called for a go around in response. The captain however replied to wait and see then ignored the warning.

The AIIO analysed that in post flight interviews the captain (German ATPL) had experience in flying in such weather conditions. He also remarked that he better perceived wind data provided in knots than in m/s.

Metars:
UACC 220900Z 04007MPS 010V070 9999 SCT011 BKN050CB 13/10 Q1011 R04/15//65 TEMPO VRB16MPS 3000 TSRA SQ BKN015CB RMK QFE727/0969=
UACC 220830Z 02009MPS 9999 SCT030CB BKN100 14/10 Q1011 R04/15//65 TEMPO VRB20MPS 3000 TSRA SQ BKN015CB RMK QFE727/0969=
UACC 220800Z 01010G16MPS 9999 VCTS SCT030CB BKN130 15/12 Q1010 R04/2///60 TEMPO VRB25MPS 2000 TSRA SQ BKN020CB RMK QFE726/0969=
UACC 220730Z 32017G25MPS 9999 -SHRA VCTS SCT013CB BKN070 15/12 Q1010 R22/2///60 TEMPO VRB25MPS 2000 TSRA SQ BKN020CB RMK QFE726/0969=
UACC 220700Z 25009MPS 9999 SCT030CB BKN110 24/07 Q1008 R22/0///70 TEMPO VRB14MPS 3000 TSRA SQ BKN020CB RMK QFE725/0967=
UACC 220630Z 23009MPS 9999 FEW030CB SCT110 24/07 Q1009 R22/0///70 NOSIG RMK QFE725/0967=
UACC 220600Z 25006MPS 9999 FEW030CB SCT110 25/06 Q1009 R22/0///70 NOSIG RMK QFE726/0968=
UACC 220530Z 24008MPS 9999 FEW040 SCT110 24/07 Q1010 R22/0///70 NOSIG RMK QFE726/0968=
UACC 220500Z 26008G13MPS 9999 FEW040 BKN110 23/06 Q1010 R22/0///70 NOSIG RMK QFE727/0969=
UACC 220430Z 25008MPS 9999 FEW040 BKN110 22/05 Q1011 R22/0///70 NOSIG RMK QFE727/0969=
UACC 220400Z 24008MPS 9999 FEW040 BKN110 22/06 Q1011 R22/0///70 NOSIG RMK QFE727/0969=