Flybe DH8D at Newquay on Apr 17th 2018, possible tail strike on landing

Last Update: November 8, 2018 / 20:09:09 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Flybe G-JECX, De Havilland Dash 8 (400) — Flybe G-JECX, De Havilland Dash 8 (400) (Photo credit: markyharky / Flickr / License: CC by)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Apr 17, 2018

Classification
Incident

Airline
Flybe

Flight number
BE-353

Departure
Manchester, United Kingdom

Destination
Newquay, United Kingdom

Aircraft Registration
G-JECX

Aircraft Type
De Havilland Dash 8 (400)

ICAO Type Designator
DH8D

Airport
Newquay Cornwall Airport, Newquay

Airport ICAO Code
EGHQ

A Flybe de Havilland Dash 8-400, registration G-JECX performing flight BE-353 from Manchester,EN to Newquay,EN (UK) with 56 passengers, aborted a first approach to Newquay's runway 12 due to weather conditions, repositioned for another approach and continued for a touch down. The aircraft rolled out without further incident and taxied to the apron.

The aircraft was unable to depart for its return flight and is still on the ground in Newquay about 33 hours later.

The airline reported they are investigating a possible tail strike on landing. All passengers disembarked safely.

A passenger reported the crew advised prior to the first approach, that the landing would be "spicy", on a curry level jalfrezi, but then aborted the first approach and went around. The second approach ended in a very hard touchdown.

On Nov 8th 2018 the AAIb released their bulletin stating that a tail strike had indeed occurred. The AAIB concluded:

The tailstrike occurred because the pilot flying reacted instinctively to the high sink rate by increasing pitch attitude and power, rather than increasing power only. The aircraft manufacturer recommends that operators provide annual recurrent training in pitch awareness for flight crew to establish the correct response to high sink rate near the ground.

The AAIB analysed:

During the first approach the aircraft became displaced from the centreline in the turbulent conditions. The co-pilot decided to go around as he was concerned the approach no longer met the operator’s stable approach criteria.

The second approach met the stable approach criteria until approximately 50 ft. At this point the co-pilot reduced power to flight idle in response to increase airspeed, although neither pilot was aware that the power had been reduced this much. The reduction in power, probably combined with a reduction in headwind, resulted in a significantly increased rate of descent. The co-pilot reacted instinctively by increasing power and pitch attitude. The pitch attitude increased to 10º, which resulted in the aircraft tail contacting the runway before the main wheels. The increase in power did not take effect before the tail contacted the runway. The commander reacted to the increased rate of descent by calling for more power in accordance with the operator’s and manufacturer’s guidance. The time from pitch attitude increasing beyond 5º to the tail contacting the runway was less than one second, giving very little time for the commander to take any corrective action. After the tail strike the commander took control and elected to continue the landing as he was concerned the aircraft may be damaged.

Metars:
EGHQ 171450Z 19018KT 4000 -RADZ BR OVC004 11/11 Q1016=
EGHQ 171420Z 20015KT 3500 -RADZ BR OVC003 12/11 Q1016=
EGHQ 171350Z 21018KT 4000 -RADZ BR BKN004 12/11 Q1016=
EGHQ 171320Z 20022KT 3500 -RADZ BR BKN004 11/11 Q1016=
EGHQ 171250Z 20017KT 3500 -RADZ BR BKN004 12/11 Q1015=
EGHQ 171220Z 21016KT 3500 -RADZ BR BKN004 12/11 Q1015=
EGHQ 171150Z 20018KT 3500 -RADZ BR BKN005 12/11 Q1015=
EGHQ 171120Z 20019KT 3500 -RADZ BR BKN006 11/11 Q1014=
EGHQ 171050Z 20022G33KT 3000 -RADZ BR BKN004 11/10 Q1014=
EGHQ 171020Z 19022G33KT 4000 -RADZ BR BKN006 11/10 Q1014=