Pegasus A20N at Bucharest on Mar 30th 2018, touched down before runway threshold

Last Update: November 21, 2022 / 18:28:06 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Pegasus Airlines TC-NBF, Airbus A320-200N — Pegasus Airlines TC-NBF, Airbus A320-200N (Photo credit: Alec BHX/KKC / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Mar 30, 2018

Classification
Incident

Airline
Pegasus Airlines

Flight number
PC-361

Departure
Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen, Turkey

Destination
Bucharest Otopeni, Romania

Aircraft Registration
TC-NBF

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320-200N

ICAO Type Designator
A20N

Airport
Henri Coandă International Airport, Bucharest

Airport ICAO Code
LROP

A Pegasus Airbus A320-200N, registration TC-NBF performing flight PC-361 from Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen (Turkey) to Bucharest Otopeni (Romania), was on final approach to Otopeni's runway 08L when the aircraft touched down ahead of the displaced runway threshold. The aircraft rolled out without further incident and taxied to the gate.

The aircraft was able to depart for the return flight after about 6.5 hours on the ground and reached Istanbul with a delay of 5.5 hours.

Romania's AAIB rated the occurrence a serious incident and opened an investigation stating the aircraft did not receive any damage.

In November 2022 Romania's AAIB released their final report concluding the probable cause of the serious incident was:

the inefficient crew communication during the final approach.

The AAIB analysed:

On 30.03.2018, the aircraft type A-320 Neo, registered TC-NBF, performed a commercial flight on the route Istanbul LTFJ – Bucharest LROP.

At 11:15 LT (08:15 UTC) the aircraft touched-down on the runway 08L, before the displaced runway threshold and vacated on the ”V” taxiway.

On the radar recording of the airport’s Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (ASMGCS) at GND (GROUND) Otopeni it can be observed that the aircraft A320 Neo (flight PGT9M) was on runway 08L at 08:15 UTC within the runway restricted area.

In the airport's internal aviation safety investigation report it is specified that after the landing the A320 Neo aircraft vacated on the ”V” taxiway.

Considering the short available braking distance (almost 600 m) between the displaced threshold of runway 08L/26R and the ”V”- taxiway, and the aircraft type (A320), it was decided to perform an immediate runway check.

After checking the displaced threshold of runway 08L it was found that two overhead lamps from the lighting signal assembly were destroyed.

After this serious incident, the runway was declared closed, by NOTAM,
at 11:30 LT (08:30 UTC).

Further on, it was also checked the aircraft condition. It was found that the tire no.2 of the nose landing gear and the tire no.1 of the main right landing gear were damaged.

Analysis of the available data resulted in the following:

- The pilots knew about the fact that the threshold of runway 08L was displaced;

- Considering that the GP for runway 08L was unserviceable, the DME for runway 08L was also unserviceable, the PF (pilot flying) performed a visual non-precision landing procedure for the operational runway

- It is possible that the PF might have a wrong visual reference because it can be noticed that the aircraft has positive contact on the ground, in the touchdown zone 08L for the runway without the displaced threshold;

- It is possible that the PF did not use for the vertical aircraft position check, in order to land, the PAPI visual system (Precision Approach Path Indicator - a set of lights that enables pilots to judge if their glide slope is correct in the final approach to landing) because if he would have used the system, which was repositioned for the displaced threshold of runway 08L, then the aircraft would have had a correct slope of 3° from this new threshold and a height of 50ft when flying over it;

- The PM (pilot monitoring), as pilot in command, did not make any action to correct the aircraft vertical position for landing, regarding the runway displaced threshold;

- There was no efficient communication in the cockpit between the PF and PM: no standard call-outs were performed, at least for the intermediate and final approach for landing, there was no efficient management of the flight crew members resources (CRM) in terms of performing normal procedures (Airbus/Flight Operations Briefing Notes/FOBN/Human Performance/CRM Aspects in Incidents/Accidents; FOBN/Standard Operating Procedures/Standard Calls; FOBN/Descent Management/Descent and Approach Profile Management).

Metars:
LROP 301000Z VRB02KT CAVOK 16/05 Q1016 NOSIG=
LROP 300930Z 10003KT 050V150 CAVOK 15/04 Q1016 NOSIG=
LROP 300900Z VRB02KT CAVOK 14/04 Q1016 NOSIG=
LROP 300830Z VRB03KT CAVOK 14/04 Q1016 NOSIG=
LROP 300800Z 06004KT 030V130 CAVOK 12/05 Q1016 NOSIG=
LROP 300730Z 06004KT 030V130 CAVOK 12/05 Q1016 NOSIG=
LROP 300700Z 06004KT 040V100 CAVOK 11/04 Q1016 NOSIG=
LROP 300630Z VRB02KT CAVOK 09/05 Q1016 NOSIG=
LROP 300600Z VRB02KT 9000 NSC 08/04 Q1016 NOSIG=
LROP 300530Z 08003KT 8000 NSC 07/05 Q1015 NOSIG=
LROP 300500Z 00000KT 5000 BR NSC 05/04 Q1015 NOSIG=