Binter AT72 at Tenerife on Dec 6th 2017, near collision with private aircraft

Last Update: July 4, 2018 / 21:04:34 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Binter Canarias EC-MPI, ATR ATR-72-200 — Binter Canarias EC-MPI, ATR ATR-72-200 (Photo credit: Rosedale7175 / Flickr / License: CC by-sa)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Dec 6, 2017

Classification
Incident

Cause
Near collision

Airline
Binter Canarias

Flight number
NT-631

Departure
Tenerife North, Spain

Destination
Santa Cruz de La Palma, Spain

Aircraft Registration
EC-MPI

Aircraft Type
ATR ATR-72-200

ICAO Type Designator
AT72

A Binter Canarias Avions de Transport Regional ATR-72-212A, registration EC-MPI performing flight NT-631 from Tenerife North,CI to Santa Cruz de La Palma,CI (Spain), departed Tenerife North's runway 12, climbed to FL100 following the standard departure route ARACO3K and was cleared to proceed direct to the fix 8.5nm before the runway 36 at La Palma Airport.

A private Piper PA-28 intending to land at Tenerife North Airport was enroute at FL115, the crew was in contact with a different controller than the ATR crew. The PA28 requested to descend toward Tenerife. The controller provided traffic information for the ATR-72 and instructed the PA28 to maintain current flight level until visual with the ATR. When the two aircraft were about 3nm apart the PA28 pilot reported the ATR in sight, the controller cleared the PA28 to descend and for the approach to runway 12.

The controller in contact with the ATR left his work place and handed control to the planning controller, who however was unaware of the presence of the PA28. The controller was surprised when the ATR crew advised they had received a TCAS resolution advisory.

After being clear of conflict the ATR continued their flight to La Palma Airport, the PA28 landed safely in Tenerife.

Spain's CIAIAC reported the separation between the two aircraft reduced to 200 feet vertically and 1.13nm horizontally despite the aircraft being visual. Both aircraft continued their flights after the loss of conflict. An investigation has been opened.

On Jul 4th 2018 the CIAIAC released their final report in Spanish concluding the probable cause of the incident was:

The controller in contact with the ATR did not inform the ATR of the presence and proximity of the PA28.

Contributing was a poor transfer of control to the planning controller during the temporary absence of the controller and lack of compliance with the agreements of how to hand off aircraft between the sectors by the controllers.

The CIAIAC reported the Tenerife North Controller was unable to contact the GCCCIMB sector controlling the ATR, coordination had to be made via the Tenerife South Approach Controller.

GCCCIMB was in contact with the ATR. The controller had to be absent and handed the control to the planning controller, however, without running the checklists and thus without properly advising the planning controller of the current traffic situation. The planning controller thus remained unaware of the presence of the PA28.

The PA28 was in contact with Tenerife North Approach and was instructed to remain 1000 feet above the ATR until visual contact was established. Once the PA28 reported they had the ATR in sight the controller cleared the PA28 to descend, however, did not provide the PA28 crew with the traffic information even though the two aircraft were on converging tracks.

The separation between the aircraft reduced to 200 feet vertical and 1,13 nm. A TCAS resolution advisory was triggered in the cockpit of the ATR, the crew complied with and informed ATC. The planning controller was surprised by the TCAS RA, however, the investigation found no evidence that the planning controller attempted to contact Tenerife North Approach or Tenerife South Approach to clarify what was ongoing.