Jazz DH8D at Toronto on Nov 9th 2017, hard landing at more than +5.5G, aircraft departs for return flight

Last Update: July 9, 2018 / 14:53:05 GMT/Zulu time

Bookmark this article
Incident Facts

Date of incident
Nov 9, 2017

Classification
Accident

Flight number
QK-7977

Aircraft Registration
C-GYJZ

ICAO Type Designator
DH8D

Airport ICAO Code
CYTZ

A Jazz de Havilland Dash 8-400, registration C-GYJZ performing flight QK-7977 from Montreal,QC to Toronto Billy Bishop,ON (Canada) with 52 passengers and 4 crew, landed on Billy Bishop Airport's runway 26 in gusty wind conditions but bounced and touched down firmly at 20:49L (01:49Z Nov 10th), the flight data recorder caution light illuminated. The aircraft rolled out and taxied to the apron.

The Canadian TSB reported the flight crew consulted with company maintenance, performed a visual inspection of the aircraft and found no anomaly. It was subsequently decided that a hard landing inspection was not required and the aircraft was returned to service under minimum equipment list requirements with the flight data recorder caution light remaining illuminated.

After departure from Toronto to return to Montreal the flight crew requested a hard landing inspection after arrival in Montreal. The aircraft was taken to a hangar in Montreal, a hard landing inspection found airframe damage to aft right fuselage and right main gear. The operator involved the aircraft manufacturer to conduct damage assessment and develop a repair plan.

The TSB rated the occurrence an accident and opened an investigation.

On Jul 9th 2018 the TSB released their final report, that remained limited in scope and was released without formal conclusion.

The TSB reported

Jazz standard operating procedures (SOPs) for stable approaches allow for a deviation of −5 to +10 knots from the planned approach speed once the aircraft is below 500 feet above ground level (AGL) on approach. However, the speed of the occurrence aircraft’s approach varied from 119 to 141 knots. Because the speed deviations resulted from momentary wind gusts, the flight crew considered the approach to be stable.

Once the aircraft was below 100 feet AGL on approach, the following happened in rapid succession:

- The aircraft encountered momentary performance-degrading wind shear as a result of a wind gust, causing its airspeed to decrease.

- The pilot flying advanced the power levers.

- The aircraft touched down.

Almost immediately after touchdown, the following happened in rapid succession:

- The main landing gear began to compress.

- The engine torque, in response to the power lever advancement, increased to a maximum of 42.5% and 40% on the left and right engines, respectively.

- The aircraft encountered a performance-enhancing wind shear, which caused the airspeed to increase.

- The power levers were retarded through the flight idle gate position to the propeller discing detent position.

- The momentary increase in torque and airspeed caused the aircraft to become airborne again, up to 4.5 feet above the runway, for about 2.75 seconds.

While the aircraft was airborne, after the first touchdown, the following happened in rapid succession:

- The propeller blade angles moved through the ground-idle range into the disc position,6 which caused a significant loss of lift.

- The performance-enhancing wind shear decreased, and the combined reduction in lift resulted in the aircraft firmly contacting the runway.

- The flight data recorder (FDR) caution annunciator on the cockpit caution and warning panel illuminated (“FLT DATA RECORDER”).
At this point, the FDR and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) stopped recording. The aircraft landed after bouncing, although this landing was not recorded on the FDR. The flight crew taxied the airplane to the gate without further incident. No anomalies or injuries were noted.

The aircraft was scheduled to depart for the return flight to CYUL at 2115, which was the crew’s final flight for the day. The flight crew were aware that CYTZ’s noise abatement curfew prevents departures after 2200.
The flight crew were concerned that the landing may have been a hard landing, although the overhead bins remained closed and neither pilot considered the landing to have been firmer than others previously experienced. As a precaution, the flight crew contacted Jazz’s maintenance control centre (MCC) to enquire about the FDR caution annunciator illuminating during touchdown and to discuss the landing events.

The MCC indicated that the illumination of the FDR caution annunciator was likely not related to the landing, and referred to the aircraft maintenance manual (AMM) for guidance on a hard landing.

The MCC also indicated that, if the flight crew determined that they had experienced a hard landing, a maintenance inspection would be required. The MCC stated that no maintenance personnel were currently available at CYTZ but personnel could be brought in from the company’s hub at Toronto/Lester B. Pearson International Airport (CYYZ), Ontario. The time necessary to relocate the personnel and for the maintenance inspection to be carried out would exceed the airport’s curfew, and the return flight would therefore have to be cancelled.

The flight crew were uncertain as to whether the landing had been hard enough to warrant such action, and, with no specific parameters available for making the determination, they decided to visually examine the aircraft by performing a walkaround. The flight crew did not observe any discrepancies during the walkaround and subsequently decided to conduct the return flight to CYUL.

While preparing to depart, the flight crew noted that the FDR caution annunciator was still illuminated. They contacted the MCC to further discuss the FDR caution annunciator situation and were again told that the annunciator illumination was not likely related to the landing event.
The flight crew, in coordination with the MCC, reviewed the procedures for an illuminated FDR caution annunciator. In addition to confirming switch selections, the flight crew performed the circuit breaker reset procedure. However, the annunciator remained illuminated.

It was determined that, in accordance with Jazz’s Transport Canada–approved Q4007 minimum equipment list (MEL), the aircraft could be dispatched with the FDR inoperative, provided that the CVR was operative and repairs were made within 3 flight days. Although the CVR had been tested on the first flight of the day, neither the flight crew nor the MCC considered reconfirming that the CVR was operative at this time.

After these discussions with the MCC, the flight crew considered the aircraft to be airworthy and decided to continue with the planned departure. Once the aircraft was airborne, the flight crew recorded in the aircraft journey log book that the FDR caution annunciator had illuminated and that the MCC had deferred the item in accordance with the MEL.8 The flight crew also reported in the journey log book that they suspected a hard landing had occurred at CYTZ and suggested that maintenance perform a follow-up inspection at CYUL.

No abnormalities were noted during the takeoff, landing, or taxiing of the return flight to CYUL. Jazz maintenance personnel subsequently conducted an inspection of the aircraft at CYUL and found that the FDR system’s inertia switch had activated and that there was physical evidence of a hard landing.

The TSB reported the aircraft sustained following damage:

The inspection at CYUL found that the aircraft had sustained substantial damage, including buckling of the skin below the windows on the right fuselage. The landing conditions experienced by the right main landing gear during the second touchdown exceeded its ultimate design criteria, which resulted in failure of the orifice support tube during the in-stroke. Once the orifice support tube failed, shock strut damping was effectively lost, thereby generating significant bottoming loads.

The TSB stated the black boxes stopped due to the inertia switch opening at a vertical acceleration of more than 5.5G:

The occurrence aircraft’s electrical system includes an inertia switch to provide an automatic means of stopping both the FDR and the CVR simultaneously, which prevents the erasure feature from functioning after a crash impact.11 The double-pole inertia switch is placed in series with the power supplies of the FDR and the CVR. When subjected to a force of 5.5g along its sensitive axis, the switch opens, which interrupts the electrical path to each recorder, thereby stopping both recorders simultaneously.

When the inertia switch activated during the occurrence aircraft’s landing at CYTZ, it caused the FDR and CVR to stop simultaneously. Therefore, neither the FDR nor the CVR was in operation during the return flight to CYUL.

Metars:
CYTZ 100400Z AUTO 29019G26KT 9SM FEW036 M01/M08 A3004 RMK SLP176=
CYTZ 100300Z AUTO 29021G31KT 9SM BKN100 M00/M09 A3000 RMK SLP162=
CYTZ 100200Z AUTO 31021G32KT 9SM FEW030 SCT080 01/M05 A2996 RMK PRESRR SLP150=
CYTZ 100141Z AUTO 30024G35KT 9SM FEW036 SCT080 BKN096 02/M04 A2994 RMK PRESRR SLP142=
CYTZ 100124Z AUTO 30021G29KT 9SM -RA FEW036 SCT055 SCT067 OVC098 02/M03 A2992 RMK SLP135=
CYTZ 100114Z AUTO 31021G26KT 9SM FEW046 SCT060 SCT075 OVC099 02/M02 A2991 RMK SLP133=
CYTZ 100100Z AUTO 30016G24KT 9SM -UP BKN048 BKN060 OVC072 02/M02 A2991 RMK PRESRR SLP133=
CYTZ 100056Z AUTO 30016G25KT 9SM -UP BKN046 OVC070 02/M02 A2991 RMK SLP133=
CYTZ 100050Z AUTO 30015G28KT 9SM -RA -UP OVC044 02/M02 A2991 RMK SLP132=
CYTZ 100000Z AUTO 29017KT 9SM -RA SCT018 SCT026 SCT039 OVC048 04/01 A2987 RMK SLP120=
CYTZ 092359Z AUTO 29017KT 9SM -RA SCT018 SCT026 BKN042 OVC050 04/01 A2987 RMK SLP120=
CYTZ 092357Z AUTO 30016KT 9SM -RA SCT018 BKN024 BKN042 OVC050 04/01 A2987 RMK SLP119=
CYTZ 092334Z AUTO 30021G34KT 260V320 9SM -RA SCT021 SCT029 BKN055 OVC067 05/02 A2985 RMK SLP113=
CYTZ 092321Z AUTO 26019G26KT 9SM SCT030 SCT040 BKN055 OVC068 05/02 A2984 RMK SLP109=
CYTZ 092311Z AUTO 26020G33KT 6SM -RA BR SCT028 BKN040 OVC049 05/03 A2984 RMK PRESRR SLP109=
CYTZ 092303Z AUTO 27026G39KT 5SM -RA SCT026 OVC040 05/02 A2984 RMK PRESRR SLP109=
CYTZ 092300Z AUTO 27025G39KT 7SM -RA SCT026 OVC040 06/02 A2984 RMK PRESRR SLP107=
CYTZ 092258Z AUTO 27030G39KT 9SM -RA FEW031 OVC040 07/01 A2983 RMK SLP104=
CYTZ 092252Z AUTO 26023G30KT 9SM OVC042 08/01 A2982 RMK SLP102=
CYTZ 092236Z AUTO 24024G29KT 9SM -RA OVC044 08/01 A2982 RMK SLP101=
CYTZ 092200Z AUTO 23019G24KT 9SM OVC044 08/02 A2982 RMK SLP102=
CYTZ 092102Z AUTO 24016G22KT 9SM FEW038 SCT050 OVC065 08/03 A2983 RMK SLP105=
CYTZ 092100Z AUTO 24018G24KT 9SM -RA FEW038 OVC065 08/02 A2983 RMK SLP105=
Aircraft Registration Data
Registration mark
C-GYJZ
Country of Registration
Canada
Date of Registration
D fkAihbbjclb Subscribe to unlock
Certification Basis
QqgAngAAgpAbmjfkjpmqmjnhbiidgcmeggpnnAb ikhqci Subscribe to unlock
TCDS Ident. No.
Manufacturer
Dehavilland
Aircraft Model / Type
DHC-8-402
ICAO Aircraft Type
DH8D
Year of Manufacture
Serial Number
Aircraft Address / Mode S Code (HEX)
Maximum Take off Mass (MTOM) [kg]
Engine Count
Engine Type
Main Owner
Nkhhlgqdlkemihbilleqepfdlqkeknplpqelecpqqpieq A cqbqk eAAgfljhfdcAqlqpcmfhqikfqfkpimkncdjnchAccfnAfid cfgngepipmk Subscribe to unlock

Aircraft registration data reproduced and distributed with the permission of the Government of Canada.

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Nov 9, 2017

Classification
Accident

Flight number
QK-7977

Aircraft Registration
C-GYJZ

ICAO Type Designator
DH8D

Airport ICAO Code
CYTZ

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
Article source

You can read 2 more free articles without a subscription.

Subscribe now and continue reading without any limits!

Are you a subscriber? Login
Subscribe

Read unlimited articles and receive our daily update briefing. Gain better insights into what is happening in commercial aviation safety.

Send tip

Support AeroInside by sending a small tip amount.

Related articles

Newest articles

Subscribe today

Are you researching aviation incidents? Get access to AeroInside Insights, unlimited read access and receive the daily newsletter.

Pick your plan and subscribe

Partner

Blockaviation logo

A new way to document and demonstrate airworthiness compliance and aircraft value. Find out more.

ELITE Logo

ELITE Simulation Solutions is a leading global provider of Flight Simulation Training Devices, IFR training software as well as flight controls and related services. Find out more.

Blue Altitude Logo

Your regulation partner, specialists in aviation safety and compliance; providing training, auditing, and consultancy services. Find out more.

AeroInside Blog
Popular aircraft
Airbus A320
Boeing 737-800
Boeing 737-800 MAX
Popular airlines
American Airlines
United
Delta
Air Canada
Lufthansa
British Airways