Flybe DH8D at Newcastle on Jan 9th 2017, tail strike on landing

Last Update: October 12, 2017 / 17:46:16 GMT/Zulu time

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Photo of Flybe G-ECOJ, De Havilland Dash 8 (400) — Flybe G-ECOJ, De Havilland Dash 8 (400) (Photo credit: Frans Berkelaar / Flickr / License: CC by-nd)

Incident Facts

Date of incident
Jan 9, 2017

Classification
Report

Cause
Tail strike on landing

Airline
Flybe

Flight number
BE-147

Departure
Southampton, United Kingdom

Destination
Newcastle, United Kingdom

Aircraft Registration
G-ECOJ

Aircraft Type
De Havilland Dash 8 (400)

ICAO Type Designator
DH8D

A Flybe de Havilland Dash 8-400, registration G-ECOJ performing flight BE-147 from Southampton,EN to Newcastle,EN (UK) with 56 passengers and 4 crew, concluded an ILS approach to Newcastle's runway 25 with a landing on runway 25 with flaps 15, however, the aircraft's tail contact the runway surface. The aircraft rolled out without further incident and taxied to the apron. A post flight inspection revealed damage to the tail strike switch/sensor fairing.

The AAIB released their final report concluding the probable cause of the serious incident was:

The tailstrike occurred because of an inappropriate reduction in power during the latter stages of the approach which put the aircraft into a reduced energy state. When it started to sink the instinctive response of the pilot flying was to increase the pitch attitude, instead of the recommended trained response of increasing power.

The AAIB reported the first officer was pilot flying. He had completed his type conversion in November 2016 and had flown 49 sectors (as pilot flying) since. The crew had planned to use flaps 15 and a Vref of 118 KIAS for landing, which left just about 1.5 degrees of pitch angle between normal approach attitude and tail strike attitude, while flaps 35 would have provided for a 3.5 degrees gap.

The approach, flown on autopilot, was stable while descending through 1000 and 500 feet AGL. At 200 feet AGL the first officer disconnected the autopilot, at 100 feet AGL the first officer reduced power on both engines from 15% to 8% torque. The airspeed reduced from 124 KIAS to 113 KIAS, the pitch increased from 3.7 degrees to 7.6 degrees. The captain (36, ATPL, 4,732 hours total, 4,559 hours on type), sensing the aircraft's increased sink rate, advised the first officer to apply power, and at 8 feet AGL advanced the power levers himself. The aircraft touched down and bounced, the "TOUCHED RUNWAY" caption illuminated. The captain aware of the tail strike took control of the aircraft, recovered the aircraft and landed the aircraft on the remaining runway without further incident.

The AAIB analysed:

The approach and landing took place in the hours of darkness, a time when there are reduced peripheral visual clues to judge height above the runway. When the aircraft was at around 100 ft aal the PF, who was relatively inexperienced on the aircraft, reduced torque to 8%, a level below the minimum of 15% recommended during approach. This put the aircraft into a low energy state leading to an increasing descent rate and a loss of airspeed. In order to counter perceived sink the PF increased the nose-up pitch instead of adding power, probably an instinctive reaction. The commander’s verbal intervention in asking the co-pilot to increase power was not effective and his own action to advance the power levers was too late to prevent the tailstrike.

On the Dash 8-400 aircraft there is a relatively small margin between a normal flare angle and the tailstrike angle. Thus, if a pilot senses the aircraft is sinking in the final stages of landing the instinctive action to increase pitch attitude is likely to result in aft fuselage runway contact. Engine power management is critical on this aircraft during flare and landing because of its direct effect on the airflow over the wing and thereby on the available lift. Training programmes to address this emphasise the use of power to control rate of descent and not pitch attitude. However, inexperienced pilots are likely to take time to acquire the skill to judge landings and under pressure may revert to an instinctive response of increasing nose-up pitch when close to the ground.