Germanwings A320 near Barcelonnette on Mar 24th 2015, first officer alone in cockpit, initiated rapid descent, aircraft impacted terrain

Last Update: April 2, 2017 / 11:41:26 GMT/Zulu time

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Incident Facts

Date of incident
Mar 24, 2015

Classification
Crash

Airline
Germanwings

Aircraft Registration
D-AIPX

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320

ICAO Type Designator
A320

On Mar 24th 2017 the family of the first officer, represented by the father of the first officer, gave a press conference to present their view on the status of investigations and findings.

It is editorial line to keep out of covering legal proceedings surrounding aviation occurrences and focus only on the aviation safety investigations. Reason being, that legal proceedings are mainly geared to assign a guilt but not necessarily to identify factors that help to avoid a repeat. This is why there is an aviation safety investigation at all besides the legal proceedings. According to ICAO Annex 13 the only and only task of an aviation safety investigation is to establish the causes of an occurrence in order to avoid a repeat of the same causes/circumstances.

This case is no different, there were/are legal proceedings under way initiated by the states attorneys in Marseille (France), still ongoing, and Dusseldorf (Germany), closed by Dec 15th 2016, with the aim to identify persons, who are legally responsible for this crash. The states attorney of Marseille announced, 2 days after the aircraft had impacted the mountain side near Barcelonnette, that the first officer had wilfully and intentionally flown the aircraft into terrain with the intention of committing suicide. His German counterpart in Dusseldorf stated a few days later that he had been suffering from depression. We have not been covering all these legal proceedings so far, and we have no intention to change our policy in this respect.

I was in Berlin (Germany) from Mar 24th to Mar 27th 2017 for various meetings related to the work of The Aviation Herald. Being in Berlin at the time the press conference by the father of the first officer was taking place I took the opportunity to visit the press conference and hear directly, why the family of the first officer doubt the findings by the BEA as well as the states attorneys in Marseille (France) and Dusseldorf (Germany) preparing to request further investigation into the circumstances of the crash based on evidence already collected by the states attorney of Dusseldorf and documented in their 16,000+ pages files.

After completing my meetings in Berlin and returning home I spent considerable time to think through the arguments pro and contra covering the contents of the press conference. I found, that the contents of the press conference will probably also directly influence the aviation safety investigations and do conflict with the final report as released by France's BEA. As such I decided after this careful consideration that it is the obligation of The Aviation Herald to report circumstances becoming known - even based on legal files and presented during the press conference of relatives - that could have direct impact on the aviation safety investigation. The Aviation Herald then took considerable time to cross check the contents of the press conference with the evidence available, also cross checking the evidence collected by the investigations so far where ever possible.

Father's statements

The father stated that his son never suffered from a depression. His son went through a depressive episode in 2008/2009 but overcame it completely. Following the episode he knew his son as a strong person full of joy of living until the day of the accident. Yet, he is not trying to whitewash his son. He wants certainty by proof beyond reasonable doubt that his son did indeed commit the alleged crime the states attorneys were accusing him of and wanted to remove the doubts that the family was having. Therefore he asked for a review of the files by an independent expert which resulted in an expertise to be produced. If the review of the investigation folders had brought about certainty that his son intentionally and in suicidal mission flew the aircraft into the mountainside, the family would have accepted that fact and would have been able to deal with the finding. The review however brought about evidence, contained in the investigation folders by the states attorneys and French Gendarmerie Aviation Unit (in fact, no new evidence was brought up by the father), that confirmed the doubts of the family and underlined the necessity of further investigation. It is too early to conclude his son is guilty or innocent at this time before further investigation into the conflicting evidence collected by the investigators is completed. There was no doubt on the father's mind, that as much as he wants to find the truth about the crash the relatives of the other victims want the truth and certainty as well rather than upholding a possibly unjustified condemnation in advance.

As result the aim of the family is to show what gaping holes do exist in the investigation and what procedural errors were made during the investigation, which raise doubt over the entire investigation and its results, and to ensure, that additional research fills those gaping holes and creates certainty. It is not the aim to present alternative scenarios however, any such impression that may arise out of the necessity to show the holes in the investigation is not intended.

The first 2 days after the crash and premature announcement of the cause

The states attorney of Marseille announced 2 days after the crash, well before the flight data recorder and most of other crucial evidence had been discovered and based only on a first listening to the cockpit voice recorder, that the first officer had intentionally steered the aircraft into the mountainside and suggested suicidal intention. The states attorney reported that breathing until impact could be heard on the CVR meaning the first officer was alive, the aircraft is called by ATC several times without reply, ATC asked other aircraft to contact the A320 however also without reply, alarms activated on board of the aircraft due to proximity to the ground, strong violent knocks were heard almost as if to open the cockpit door violently, there was no Mayday call. The states attorney finally stated the most plausible and probable interpretation is that the first officer by voluntary abstention refused to open the cockpit door for the captain and activated the button to start the descent in what appears to be an intention to destroy the aircraft.

According to the family this is the cardinal error in the entire investigation. The result of the investigation was announced even before collection of evidence and the investigation had been started in full, in other words the investigation put the cart before the horse. This constitutes a gross violation of principles of law as well as ICAO Annex 13, which require to collect the facts first, examine and analyse the facts and then as the last step of the investigation take a conclusion.

The CVR used for first announcement 2 days after the crash

However, the first CVR assessment conducted by French Gendarmerie (they were not permitted to take notes hence no transcript could be produced), which became the base for the states attorney's statements in the subsequent press conference, clearly noted, that it can not be determined whether the person present in the cockpit was conscious or not. This important detail was never communicated to the public however. It needs to be annotated, that at the time of that press conference the flight data recorder and most other crucial evidence had not even been found yet.

In the final CVR assessment conducted by French Gendarmerie and dated May 23rd 2015 (see below), which was translated to German for use by the states attorney at Dusseldorf (see below), it is written: "Es wird nachgewiesen dass zum Zeitpunkt des Unfalls der Linienpilot (Copilot) alleine am Steuer ist. Der Bordkommandant ist abwesend seit dem Zeitpunkt, in dem das Flugzeug seine Reiseflughöhe erreichte. Er wird nie wieder an seinen Posten zurückkehren, obwohl er mehrere Versuche mit der Türklingel, durch einen Anruf per 'public adress' oder auch den Versuch, die Tür mit stumpfen nicht identifizierten Gegenständen aufzubrechen, unternimmt. Zu diesem Ermittlungszeitpunkt sind die einzig gesicherten Informationen die, dass der Copilot alleine im Cockpit war, als der Sinkflug des Flugzeugs eingeleitet wurde, bis es auf dem Boden aufschlug. Das Abhören der verschiedenen Aufnahmekanäle ergab, dass die Atmung über die Mundmikrophone zu hören war, was bedeutet, daß er lebte, wobei nicht nachzuweisen war, ob er auch bei Bewußtsein war". Translation: "Is was proven that at the time of the accident the line pilot (copilot) was alone at the controls. The commander is not present since the time the aircraft levelled off at cruising level. He will never return to his post although he made several attempts with the doorbell, a call via public address or the attempt to break through the door using blunt unidentified objects. At this time of investigation the only verified information is, that the copilot was alone in the cockpit, when the descent until impact with the ground was started. Listening to the various recording channels revealed that breathing could be heard via the mouth microphones, which means that he lived, however it was not possible to prove, whether he was conscious."

Which opens the possibility that the first officer was incapacitated and thus raises the question, how could he then voluntarily abstain to open the door?

Could human factors and CVR experts perhaps have taken further conclusions about the condition of the human heard on the cockpit recordings from his previous voice tonality and the breathing sounds heard on the CVR and thus found out more than the technicians, who actually produced the transcript? But then, why were the human factors and CVR experts readily available both at BEA and BFU kept out of the entire investigation and were not used to analyse the CVR, although human factors and CVR experts are required to participate in any safety investigation according to ICAO Annex 13?

Was the conclusion that the first officer wilfully steered the aircraft in suicidal mission premature at this stage of the investigation setting the tone for the remainder of the investigation introducing a confirmation bias and making it very difficult for the states attorney to permit the civil (safety investigation by the BEA) and criminal investigation look into different directions raising the danger he as a jurist dedicated to proper legal proceedings would need to admit condemnation in advance?

Actions like speed adjustments presumed done by the first officer

In a number of following press conferences the states attorney of Marseille reported without a doubt that this was a suicidal mission in full intention and reasoned, that the speed of the aircraft changed frequently so the first officer must have adjusted the speeds.

However, is this reasoning correct at all? Are the FDR parameters reliable at all (see also below regarding the conflicting autopilot modes)? The "selected speed" entry can be updated by multiple sources, including of course the rotary knob on the FCU, but also automated sources e.g. during mode changes when present aircraft parameters are mirrored into the autopilot settings. The source of this parameter on the flight data recorder therefore is one of the many computers, which combines automatic and manual input sources, pre-processes such sources and then puts out the selected speed. Hence, a change on the "selected speed" on the FDR does not necessarily mean, that the human in the cockpit has changed the speed window/moved the rotary knob. The same is true for the parameter showing the side stick movements, the FDR parameter is not directly taken off the sidestick but a subsequent computer. The exact sources and the exact logic of the parameters recorded on the FDR have yet to be explained by Airbus, the investigation however did not request such an explanation. This is a very important detail, which may impact several other issues.

The aircraft was flying on autopilot tracking Mach Mode at FL380. During the descent, as the aircraft descends into more dense and warmer air, the true airspeed reduces as well as the IAS increases in order to maintain the selected Mach. Descending through about FL270 the autopilot automatically switches to IAS mode now holding a fixed IAS while TAS and Mach reduce. The FDR in combination with the CVR however does not reveal any evidence that the speed in the FCU was changed even though for example the BEA final report reports in the factual part that the "selected speed" was changed a number of times suggesting to the readers not being aware of this fundamental detail of the FDR sources, that this must have been manual input which further puts into the readers' minds that this could only have been an intentional act, hence suicide. Any such conclusion however is misleading until the exact source of the FDR parameter and the logic leading to that parameter is fully explained.

Conflicting Modes on Autopilot activating exactly at the time of start of descent

The FDR shows, that exactly at the time when the final descent started at 09:30:53z, two modes in the autopilot's pitch channel became active (see below), that were conflicting and technically impossible to be active at the same time. These conflicting modes remained active until impact with terrain at 09:41:06z. French Gendarmerie recognized this very fact and left according notes with the FDR printout, they even contacted Airbus and asked Airbus, who confirmed these two modes were impossible to be active at the same time. However, no further investigation into this detail was conducted. This detail either means the FDR was receiving invalid data and therefore not only these particular data but a lot more data were in doubt and an in depth investigation was needed to determine which parameters were correct and which weren't, or the autopilot indeed suffered a malfunction, but then it is even possible that the whole descent as well as the various modes and "selected speeds" were the result of the autopilot malfunction as well as the conflicting modes "fighting" with each other and no human intervention at all was needed to initiate that descent and outcome. It remains unclear what autopilot response the activation of these conflicting modes would produce, this would be needed to be explained by Airbus, but such explanation was not requested. Hence it is inexplicable, why this very crucial conflict was never being looked into.

Missing G-Load FDR parameter

The FDR printouts produced by Airbus for French Gendarmerie do not contain any G-Load data at all, hence it can not be determined whether the aircraft was exposed to unusual vertical accelerations or turbulence.

Keypad, normal and emergency entry

The first officer was alone in the cockpit, the captain had left the cockpit. When he returned, he used the "ring" function on the door-keypad, an associated tone can be heard on the CVR, but no reaction (only breathing), in particular no movement of switches. There is no evidence whatsoever (also see above in the statement describing the findings on the CVR), that the captain ever succeeded on inputting the emergency code on the door-keypad, and there is no evidence on the CVR/FDR that the door switch was flipped into the "LOCK" position.

Signficance of this: Following the knock function (one specific digit plus another specific key) the door opens, if the cockpit door switch is actively put into the "UNLOCK" position from the middle "NORM" position. Without moving the switch into the UNLOCK position the door remains closed. Following the emergency code (three specific digits plus another specific key) another 15 seconds long tone is played in the cockpit, during which the door switch must be flipped into the "LOCK" position to keep the door shut. If at the end of the preset reaction time the switch is not in the LOCK position, the door opens permitting entry into the cockpit even if the person(s) in the cockpit is/are incapacitated. The door-keypad can be locked any time for 5 minutes (red LED illuminated) by flipping the door switch to "LOCK".

The fact, that the normal entry buzzer sounded and there is no evidence that the door switch was moved, makes clear that the door-keypad was not locked.

This raises the question why the captain never succeeded in inputting the emergency code which could have given him access to the cockpit? Could it be related to an alleged incident some time earlier, where with the aircraft being electrically powered a crew on the ground managed to lock themselves out of the cockpit due to a failed digit key on the door-keypad and needed maintenance to get into the cockpit again? BEA and BFU were informed about that alleged occurrence on D-AIPX some time prior to the accident, however, there is no evidence in the files that this was investigated. Would it not have been mandatory according to MEL that at any time there are two persons in the cockpit?

It is noteworthy that the function of emergency entry code is tested only by maintenance every 12,000 flight hours. No check is performed routinely before flight or when conducting the first flight of the day.

Why did the investigation not raise two highly important safety recommendations recognizing the fact, that it was a well possible scenario, that a failed door-keypad, e.g. a defective digit key necessary to type the emergency code, could lead to this: a pilot takes a toilet break, the other pilot remaining alone in the cockpit becomes incapacitated in the meantime, the first pilot tries to return, but the entry of the emergency code does not succeed because a particular key is not being accepted/registered, the pilot is no longer able to return to the cockpit, and the aircraft continues to fly on autopilot until it runs out of fuel. Would it not have been reasonable to immediately issue the safety recommendation to have the emergency access to the cockpit verified at least before the first flight of the day by the flight crew?

Given the difficulty of determining the status of the door pad and access via the CVR, would it not have been prudent to immediately recommend that the door-keypad keys as well as its status is being recorded on the FDR? Why are both recommendations not present in the BEA final report, in particular as the entire cockpit door protection was introduced only after 2001 and all its implications, like the door-keypad and door status becoming focal point of an accident investigation, had not been considered?

The alleged testing of the suicide

The states attorney of Marseille reported in the early press conferences that the first officer had also been alone in the cockpit during the initial descent into Barcelona on the previous flight, when the captain had left the cockpit. During that time, the states attorney reported, the altitude target at the FCU was selected to 100 feet and back to assigned flight level, the BEA reports the aircraft had just been established in the descent from FL370 to FL350 following appropriate clearance when the altitude target was briefly changed to 100 feet for 3 seconds, changed to 49000 feet and then returned to 35000 feet. The states attorney speculated that the first officer was "preparing and testing his later suicide" at that time but did not yet decide to go forward with the idea. The states attorney even claimed the first officer was testing the moves to fly the aircraft into terrain. However, there is no evidence to that, the states attorney can not know what was on the mind of the first officer, malicious intent or just an innocent pilot activity, and is therefore only speculating.

When the altitude target window on the FCU is being changed, a flag appears on the ND indicating where the aircraft would reach that target altitude with its present configuration, in particular speed and vertical speed. The first officer used to be a glider pilot (who needed to exactly time his approaches into an airfield to arrive on the runway, not before and not beyond). It is quite possible that by selecting the aerodrome level (elevation 14 feet, closest possible setting 100 feet on the altitude target) he just checked, where the current rate of descent and speed would take them in order to plan the rate of descent, power setting etc. to perform a continuous descent until reaching the IAF. There are other explanations as well without the need of assuming malicious attempt. Fact is that this target altitude never had influence on the aircraft's flight path, and any claim he was testing his suicide can only and only remain speculation by the states attorney of Marseille and the German accredited BFU representative as stated in his letter published in the Annex of the BEA final report (they don't know what was on the first officers mind and can't prove therefore whether there was any malicious intent associated with it or whether it was some very innocent pilot practise to check out, instead of computing manually, where the aircraft would reach that altitude).

Depression, psychic event, health history

The states attorneys of Marseille and Dusseldorf as well as BFU and BEA all claimed from the beginning that the first officer was suffering from a depression, changing to mental disorder and psychotic symptoms as the investigation progressed, and even stated that the first officer was in hospital care for having the depression treated.

However, Dusseldorf terminated all their investigations in December 2016 stating, that evidence has proven that the first officer did not suffer from a depression and was not under the influence of medication, drugs or other substances like alcohol. None of the medical experts including neurologists and psychiatrists, the first officer had consulted in response to his eyesight problems, diagnosed any suicidal tendencies. This was never communicated to the public however.

Dusseldorf found out, that in December 2014 the first officer noticed a problem with his eyesight, his eyesight seemed discoloured (as like looking through sunglasses) and when looking into bright light sources he saw them blurred. He was concerned about his eyesight (and his medical, however, he was insured against loss of medical and would not have lost any income). Having a doctor in his family, the first officer was used to seek not only one opinion, but second opinions from multiple doctors if necessary. None of the eye doctors he visited found any organic or psychological problem that could have explained the problem with the eyes (however, none of the doctors was specialist for nerves or optic nerve and the optic nerve thus was never checked). His general practitioner took over an erroneous note into her files that he possibly had been in hospital care for depression but mistyped that information making the information appear as if it was for certain. The information was false however. The general practitioner decided, as there were no organic or psychological reasons for the eyesight problems to treat him for psychic problems on suspicion. The first officer was prescribed relevant medication. She wrote him sick as a precaution. Post mortem hair tests and the forensic toxicology confirmed that he had been taking the prescribed medication in the past, but also confirmed he was not under their influence at the time of the accident.

The first officer's family reported that in the UK it is permitted to fly passenger transport aircraft even while taking that medication (SSRI's). Therapeutically doses of this medication remain without any effect. The treatment was stopped before the co-pilot reported for duty again on Mar 23rd 2015. There is no legal requirement in Germany for "healthy note" after having been on sick leave. The co-pilot possessed a sick note that was received by his employer and was sufficient to render him sick for the time he was using the medication. So a second sick leave note by his general practitioner which exceeded the time the co-pilot was using his medication was not to be used anymore after he decided to return to duty and was consequently torn up. It is still in public memory however, what was made out of this in the press conferences by both Dusseldorf and Marseille (the recordings of the press conferences are still online, too).

On Mar 27th 2015 the states attorney of Dusseldorf had reported in their press conference that torn up sick leave notes had been found in the first officer's apartment, he obviously had concealed illnesses, no farewell letter was found, no evidence of political or religious background of the events was found. Medical records were found indicating an existing illness and treatment. The found torn sick leave notes included the day of the accident. Preliminary analysis suggests that the first officer concealed his illness from his employer and his professional environment.

The first officer however had submitted an according sick leave note including Mar 22nd 2015 with Germanwings (see below). Germanwings received the sick leave note on Mar 19th 2015.

Almost two years later the states attorney of Dusseldorf wrote in his closing decision (see below): "Mangels Hinweisen auf eine akute Erkrankung war es zulässig, auf die Hinzuziehung eines externen Sachverständigen mangels Zweifeln an der Tauglichkeit zu verzichten, im Übrigen kann auch nicht festgestellt werden, dass die Hinzuziehung eines psychiatrischen Sachverständigen ein anderes Untersuchungsergebnis nach sich gezogen hätte, da sich, wie bereits ausgeführt, keine Hinweise darauf ergeben haben, daß der Copilot zum Zeitpunkt der jeweiligen Untersuchungen an einer psychischen Erkrankung oder an Tinnitus litt oder sonstige Erkrankungen vorlagen, die Zweifel an der Tauglichkeit hätten begründen können. ... Im Übrigen ist ein Zusammenhang zwischen entsprechenden organischen Erkrankung und einer zum Vorfallzeitpunkt gerade nicht diagnostizierten Depression nicht festzustellen." Translation: "Lacking hints of an acute illness it was permissable to waive consultation of an external expert due to lack of doubts of fitness, apart from that it could not be established that the involvement of a psychiatric expert would have brought about a different investigation result, because - as already stated - no clues were found that the first officer was suffering from an psychic illness, tinnitus or other illnesses at the times of the various tests, that could have justified doubts of fitness. ... Apart from that a connection between corresponding organic illnesses and a not diagnosed depression at the time of the accident could not be established."

The states attorney of Dusseldorf continues later in that decision referencing the general practitioner's decision to initiate treatment for suspected psychic problems: "Wie bereits ausgeführt haben die Ermittlungen ergeben, dass bei dem Co-Piloten des Fluges offenbar im Dezember 2014 psychische Probleme im Zusammenhang mit vermeintlichen Sehbeschwerden aufgetreten sind, für die sich im Rahmen der umfangreichen Untersuchungen bei zahlreichen augenärztlichen Fachärzten und Klinken keine organische Grundlage ergeben hat, sodass von einer psychosomatischen Ursache ausgegangen worden ist. Diese hat dazu geführt, dass u.a. von der Hausärztin in Düsseldorf eine Überweisung in die psychiatrische Ambulanz und Tagesklinik an der Uniklink Düsseldorf ausgestellt worden ist. Soweit diese in einer Verdachtsdiagnose von einer Psychose ausgegangen ist, ist dieser Umstand offenbar darauf zurückzuführen, dass sie - ohne psychiatrische Fachärztin zu sein - die wahrscheinlich psychosomatischen Sehbeschwerden des Co-Piloten als Halluzination interpretiert hat, ansonsten lassen die Beschwerden des Co-Piloten keinerlei für eine Psychose relevanten Symptome erkennen." Translation: "As already explained the investigation showed that the first officer of the flight obviously suffered from psychic problems in relation to assumed eye sight problems in December 2014, for which no organic reason could be found in extensive check-ups at numerous eye specialists and clinics, so that a psychosomatic reason was assumed. This resulting e.g. in the general practitioner in Dusseldorf to issue a referral to the psychiatric outpatient department and outpatients clinic at the university clinic in Dusseldorf. As far as this diagnosis on suspicion assumed a psychosis, it is obvious that she - although no psychiatric specialist - interpreted the probable psychosomatic eye sight issues as hallucinations, however no further relevant symptoms for a psychosis are recognizable."

In short: there were no indications of any psychic issue except for the interpretation of the first officer's general practitioner, who assumed psychosomatic reasons interpreting the eyesight issues as hallucinations. The keyword is "assumed" here, it was not a definitive diagnosis, only a suspicion. A validation of such suspicion can only be done by a specialist doctor, in this case a psychiatric doctor. However, all statements by states attorneys in Marseille and Dusseldorf as well as the final report issued by the BEA ("The collision with the ground was due to the deliberate and planned action of the co-pilot who decided to commit suicide while alone in the cockpit. The process for medical certification of pilots, in particular self-reporting in case of decrease in medical fitness between two periodic medical evaluations, did not succeed in preventing the co-pilot, who was experiencing mental disorder with psychotic symptoms, from exercising the privilege of his licence") stated the mental disorder/psychic problems during the accident flight as a fact although any proof or even solid foundation for such a statement was missing in gross violation of ICAO Annex 13 and violation of law principles.

It was further confirmed that following the depressive episode in 2008/2009 the first officer had fully recovered and was permitted to complete his flight training by the FAA (had he suffered a "depression", which is a different medical term, the FAA would never ever permitted him to complete the flight training, but as it was a "depressive episode" only that was overcome, he was permitted to complete his flight training under additional conditions). He had never been in hospital care for a depression, he had never suffered a depression throughout his life. In fact the first officer had not been in any hospital except as a 4 year old when the tonsils were removed.

In their final report the BEA wrote as opening sentences of chapter 1.13.1: "In August 2008, the co-pilot started to suffer from a severe depressive episode without psychotic symptoms. During this depression, he had suicidal ideation, made several “no suicide pacts” with his treating psychiatrist and was hospitalized." The BEA responded to a first inquiry by The Aviation Herald of Mar 31st 2017: "The information that you referred to in your email (quoted from page 30, section 1.13.1 of our final report) come from Lufthansa AeMC and more specifically from the application form for the revalidation of the class 1 medical certificate, on which the co-pilot declared he had been admitted to hospital." The BEA did not reply to the specific questions submitted as result of that reply, that this was a general questionnaire asking "have you ever been in hospital care", to which the first officer truthfully replied "yes" because he had been in hospital care as a 4 year old when his tonsils were removed. Instead the BEA followed up with a generic reply to all 25 questions submitted, see chapter "Official reactions" below.

The last application form for the revalidation of the class 1 medical certificate at Lufthansa AeMC of Jul 28th 2014 (see below) shows, that the the first officer checked "yes" for hospital and down in the remarks under point 128 (Hospital) wrote "TE" (Tonsillectomy).

The same form submitted on Mar 29th 2011 shows the first officer crossed hospital yes and wrote as reason for hospitalization (point 126 on that form) in the comments section of the form: "TE als Kind" (Tonsillectomy as child).

In none of the forms, that were submitted by the first officer from April 2008 to 2014/2015, there is any mention of a visit to a hospital in 2008 or 2009 (not to mention a hospital treatment for depression) as claimed by the BEA in chapter 1.13.1 of the final report.

Further findings

In the father's press conference it was further stated, that there are many more points requiring further investigation, however, would not be explained in the press conference in order to not compromise an investigation into such issues (e.g. influencing possible witnesses). The claim to re-open the investigation and examine all those needed points, as well as the expertise identifying all those issues in the states attorneys' files have been filed with the appropriate court already, parts of the expertise have been communicated to the media in the press conference.

Official reactions to the press conference and inquiries by The Aviation Herald

The states attorney of Dusseldorf said following the press conference in response, there are no clues to causes of the crash that are not to be attributed to an intentional - suspected suicidal - behaviour.

Early Apr 1st 2017 the BEA told The Aviation Herald in response to the request of Mar 31st 2017 to receive access to the Cockpit Voice Recorder Transcript and the printout of the Flight Data Recorder used by the BEA for their investigation: "Unfortunately, it's BEA's policy not to release documents initially not included in our final report which has to be considered as our definitive release on this event."

Early Apr 1st 2017 the BEA also replied in response to the inquiry by The Aviation Herald asking for the foundation of the hospitalization in 2008 reported in the first sentence of chapter 1.13.1 in BEA's final report: "The information that you referred to in your email (quoted from page 30, section 1.13.1 of our final report) come from Lufthansa AeMC and more specifically from the application form for the revalidation of the class 1 medical certificate, on which the co-pilot declared he had been admitted to hospital." (see also the chapter about health history above about details of that form)

The Aviation Herald subsequently issued a catalogue of 25 questions trying to cross check the entire argument line by the family as described above:

I noticed you were referring to a questionnaire by Lufthansa which asked:

"have you ever been hospitalized?"

The first officer answered this correctly with yes, because he had been in hospital treatment as a 4 year old when his tonsils were removed.

1) However, can you explain, how the BEA then arrives at this wording in the final report as opening sentences on chapter 1.13.1:

"In August 2008, the co-pilot started to suffer from a severe depressive episode without psychotic symptoms. During this depression, he had suicidal ideation, made several “no suicide pacts” with his treating psychiatrist and was hospitalized."

This can not be read out of the questionnaire?

With respect to the note of hospitalization we submitted:

2) Is it only the note by the BFU, or do you have files from the hospital?
3) Can you name the hospital he was staying at?
4) Can you tell the time he was in hospital?
5) Did you ever cross check that information and get documentation of the medical records produced by that hospital?

With respect to other claims by the family we submitted:

With respect to other claims by the family:

6) Has the BEA received information about an occurrence on D-AIPX a few days prior to the crash, that a flight crew managed to lock themselves out of the cockpit while still on the ground and needed maintenance to get back into the cockpit?
7) Did the BEA investigate this occurrence, or did the BFU investigate this occurrence? Is it possible to receive that investigation report?
8) Is it correct, that this occurrence was caused by the failure of the digit x (Editorial note: actual key removed for publication) on the keypad?
9) Is the BEA in possession of the relevant tech log entries and is this occurrence included in this tech log? Was the keypad replaced, or was the defect deferred by maintenance?
10) Is the BEA aware of the significant weather predicted for the area (jetstream of 130 knots at FL280 with associated turbulence forecast between FL150 and FL370)?
11) What does the BEA make out of the chart?
12) Were there any further SIGMETs and PIREPs from that area where the descent began that day? Have they been assessed with respect to the final report?

In reference to the CVR and FDR, which The Aviation Herald would not receive, we asked following questions:

13) Does the CVR transcript that the BEA has been working of contain any remarks like unidentified noises, rattling noises, ... (noises that are not attributed to certain switches, first officer's breath, or other fully identified sources)? If yes, is there any accumulation of such noises at certain times (which times?) or have all those transcriptions of unidentified noises been removed from your version?
14) How does the BEA explain the presence of breathing noises on the CVR, according to my knowledge the first officer was wearing his noise cancelling headset which removes all the breathing noises, too?
15) What does the BEA make out of the fact, that absolutely no G-Load Data are available in the FDR?
16) Have any attempts been made to get/read out these G-Load parameters later on?
17) If the G-Load data are not contained on the FDR memory at all, how does the BEA explain this?
18) On the FDR at 09:30:53Z the autopilot activates in two conflicting modes simultaneously and has both modes active until impact at 09:41:06Z: Descent and OpenDescent. Airbus has stated, that it is impossible to activate these two modes at all, and it is technically not possible that both modes are active at the same time. Does the BEA confirm this detail of the FDR?
19) What does the BEA conclude from this specific detail (conflicting AP modes)?
20) Did the BEA analyse and evaluate whether there was a malfunction of the FDR and/or its associated data sources (also with respect to the AP conflict and G-Load), or whether there was a malfunction of the AP (and G-Load sensor)?
21) If the BEA concluded that the FDR malfunctioned, did the BEA verify and evaluate how far the FDR malfunction went, in other words which recorded parameters might be affected and thus are not reliable and what parameters would not be affected and can be treated reliable?
22) What are the data sources for the FDR parameters "selected speed", "speed management" as well as the first officer's side stick? Is directly the FCU respective the sidestick or computers having already processed such raw data?
23) What is the logic involved in the processing of these data sources?
24) How does the BEA assess the fact that the captain never completed the emergency code?
25) Is the BEA aware that there are 4 different versions of the CVR transcript?

Later on Apr 1st 2017 the BEA responded to that catalogue of 25 questions:

I am well aware that the recent press conference has renew the interest in this event but as far as the BEA is concerned, we have published the final report and have nothing else to add or to comment.

Regarding the recent press conference and any questions related to what was said or suggested, our position is as follows:

What was presented or suggested is incompatible with the factual and recorded data contained in the final report of the BEA.

In particular, the co-pilot's breathing has remained normal and constant and remains active at the aircraft's command until a few seconds before the impact.

Conversely, it is observed that the co-pilot did not at any time seek:

- to use the on-board telephone

- to contact air traffic control

- to open the cockpit door

- to solicit the assistance of the pilot-in-command

Furthermore, generally the BEA does not take part in speculations.

Thanks in advance for your understanding

Assessment of arguments

The evidence suggesting incorrect investigation proceedings appears very strong and thus clearly underlines that there is a need to conduct further investigation to clarify all those points. It remains fully open whether such investigations would lead to a completely different scenario of how this aircraft came down possibly exonerating the first officer or whether these investigations would bring about firm evidence proving the first officer's guilt beyond any reasonable doubt. This certainly is also in the best interest of the relatives of all other victims of this crash.

The Aviation Herald continues to monitor the developments including the pending decisions by the relevant courts.
Incident Facts

Date of incident
Mar 24, 2015

Classification
Crash

Airline
Germanwings

Aircraft Registration
D-AIPX

Aircraft Type
Airbus A320

ICAO Type Designator
A320

This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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