Argentinas A343 at Barcelona on Jul 5th 2014, runway incursion
Last Update: November 27, 2015 / 16:27:11 GMT/Zulu time
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Jul 5, 2014
Classification
Incident
Cause
Runway incursion
Aircraft Registration
LV-FPV
Aircraft Type
Airbus A340-300
ICAO Type Designator
A343
The investigation concluded that the serious incident was the result of a concatenated series of mistakes at various workplaces of air traffic control, that were not detected due to lack of coordination and which occurred at the time of runway configuration change just prior to the daily configuration change at 07:00L.
Contributing to the serious incident was the fact, that flight AR-1163 departed at a different time than normally scheduled and on a runway, that was not the preferred runway forcing to cross the active runway three times.
The CIAIAC reported AR-1163 was parked at position 270, was approved to start up and received taxi instructions to the departure runway 07L via taxiways NS, K and D. The first officer was pilot flying and steered the aircraft. The aircraft crossed runway 02 along taxiway K from K7 to K6, then on taxiway D was told to hold short of D1 due to a departure before being cleared to cross runway 02 towards D2. At that time the departure runway was switched to 25R. The aircraft joined taxiway M and was nearing hold short point M5, the crew noticed the red stop bars were illuminated. Ground control cleared the aircraft to cross runway 02 at M, the crew queried the red stop bar lights, which were promptly extinguished, and the aircraft continued to taxi across the runway prompting the UTAir Boeing 767-300 on short final to runway 02 to go around. The minimum separation between the aircraft, while AR-1163 was within the boundaries of the runway 02 area, reduced to 200 feet vertical and 1.15nm horizontal.
The CIAIAC reported that at 07:00L daily the runway configuration from the night configuration, which has runway 02 active, to the day configuration with runway 02 inactive. AR-1163 began to taxi at 06:40L, the go around of UTAir commenced at 06:55L.
The CIAIAC analysed that Barcelona Airport is restricted by environmental issues requiring to put crossing runway 02 into use between 23:00L and 07:00L.
A number of large aircraft, about 20% of departures, require the use of the longest runway 07L/25R available, which otherwise is the preferred runway for landings. The various coastal winds add to the burden air traffic controller have to master in order to keep up with increasing traffic numbers and the need of safe operation.
AR-1163 usually does not overnight in Barcelona, the CIAIAC continued analysis, but usually departs in the late afternoon. In this particular case AR-1163, needing the longest runway available, did depart the following morning just prior to the daily runway configuration change, which required the aircraft to cross the then active runway 02 three times other than during its usual departure time with runway 02 inactive.
The CIAIAC continued analysis that Air Traffic Control did not properly coordinate. The tower controller, in charge of all takeoffs and landings and thus being fully aware of the traffic situation at the aerodrome, had not approved the runway crossing, as the landing clearance to UTAir had already been issued. The tower controller only got aware of what had happened when the UTAir went around, he got out of his seat and actually saw what had happened.
The CIAIAC continued, that the tower controller is in charge of the stop bar lights and had activated the stop bars. However, although the aerodrome manual put the responsibility solely onto the tower controller in charge, this proved insufficient to prevent the runway incursion in this case.
The CIAIAC analysed that AR-1163 was scheduled to depart at 06:55L, 5 minutes prior to the runway configuration change. When the crew requested startup and taxi instructions at 06:20L, the active runways were 02 and 07L (requiring two crossings of runway 02) and AR-1163 was assigned to depart from runway 07L. At the time AR-1163 crossed runway 02 between D1 and D2, at 06:40L the active runways were switched to 02 and 25R. The ATC Supervisor talked to the North Controller at 06:43L and decided that AR-1163 would depart from 25R rather than 07L, now requiring a third crossing of runway 02.
In the meantime the daytime South Ground Controller had assumed duties, the supervisor provided him with incomplete information regarding night and day configuration, in particular mentioning that the last aircraft to land on runway 02 was an aircraft of Eurotrans, which however landed ahead of UTAir with two more arrivals on runway 02 outstanding. The CIAIAC commented that the communication between the two controllers, employing their own linguistic skills to quickly discuss the current scenario, was vague, ambiguous, unclear and not according to standard phraseology.
Another miscommunication occurred when the South Ground Controller handed AR-1163 to the north controller, with the supervisor interacting, while AR-1163 was joining taxiway M. As result the North Ground Controller was not aware that night time configuration was still active with landings on runway 02 pending and cleared AR-1163 to cross runway 02.
The flight crew acted correctly when they queried the stop bar lights after being cleared to cross runway 02. The North Ground Controller (operating both ground central and ground north positions), unaware of night time configuration still active and sure there was no operation on runway 02 anymore, acted according to the standard procedures for crossing a non-active runway giving the ground controller the authority to clear crossings and operate the stop bar lights and extinguished the stop bar lights.
The CIAIAC concluded analysis stating that the UTAir crew acted properly to a perceived danger. Even though some distance remained they could not be sure what AR-1163 would do and whether their performance would compromise the safety of their flight.
Incident Facts
Date of incident
Jul 5, 2014
Classification
Incident
Cause
Runway incursion
Aircraft Registration
LV-FPV
Aircraft Type
Airbus A340-300
ICAO Type Designator
A343
This article is published under license from Avherald.com. © of text by Avherald.com.
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